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Abstract 
The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at 
least 20 years. We examine a first-time regulatory action where the deductibility of the total 
value of executive compensation is limited and unavoidable. We find that, rather than reduce 
remuneration, companies reduce precautionary savings, thereby increasing risk. This suggests 
that firms pass on the burden of increased taxes to shareholders. Our results shed light on the 
effects of reforms similar to the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and contribute to prior 
findings that argue for proactive regulation to limit executive compensation. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the effect of corporate taxes on executive compensation. Fueled by 
the increased debate about inequality and the role of executive pay (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003), as well 
as strong media attention, policymakers around the world have tried several tax instruments to address 
this issue. For example, in 1993 the U.S. introduced Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
limited the tax deductibility of non–performance-based remuneration components, and in 2009 the U.K. 
implemented a bonus tax. However, because these regulations affected only certain compensation 
components, firms and managers have been able to circumvent these regulations by changing the 
composition of compensation (e.g., Rose and Wolfram 2000). Hence, whether total compensation is 
affected by corporate taxes cannot be inferred from prior literature (e.g., Rose and Wolfram 2000; 
Ehrlich and Radulescu 2017; Bird 2018)—also because income shifting responses, examined in prior 
literature, are typically much stronger than real consequences (e.g., Slemrod 1995).  
We contribute to this literature and the debate on executive compensation (e.g., Gabaix and 
Landier 2008; Graham and Qiu 2016) by examining the response of executive compensation to a limited 
tax deductibility of all compensation components. In 2017, the U.S Tax Cuts and Jobs Act introduced a 
limit to the tax deductibility of executive compensation. However, since the U.S Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
contemporaneously changed many corporate tax provisions, reduced the federal corporate tax rate from 
35% to 21%, and comprised substantial changes in the personal income tax, isolating the effect of limited 
tax deductibility using the U.S. setting is empirically challenging. We therefore examine a tax reform in 
Austria that, as in the U.S. case, comprehensively restricted tax deductibility across all remuneration 
components, such as performance- and non–performance-based pay, as well as pay in kind and other 
fringe benefits. Thus, the reform curbs all avoidance channels through shifts in compensation 
components and ultimately increases the effective corporate tax rate on executive compensation. 
Importantly, there are no contemporaneous corporate or personal income tax changes in Austria that 
might blur the identification: The Austrian reform restricts the tax deductibility of total compensation 
above € 500,000, while keeping, for example, the statutory corporate tax rate constant.  
The economic implications of the Austrian 2014 tax change are significant for firms and 
executives. To illustrate these economic implications, consider an executive with a total compensation 
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of $1,000,000. For the Austrian tax rate of 25%, the after-tax cost for the firm is $750,000. The 2014 
reform limits the deductibility to $500,000. This limit increases the after-tax cost for the firm to $875,000 
(= $1,000,000 – 25% × $500,000). This corresponds to an increase in costs at the firm level of almost 
17% to hire executives. On average, the increased tax burden for Austrian firms in our sample accounts 
for approximately 4% of income taxes payable. Taken together, the Austrian setting therefore allows us 
to answer the open question of whether limiting the tax deductibility of executive compensation can 
affect the level of executive compensation. In short, we ask whether executives bear the burden of the 
corporate tax in the form of lower wages, or if firms, and thus ultimately shareholders, bear the burden. 
This question is important for at least two reasons. First, over the past decade, economists, policy 
makers, and the media have expressed increasing concerns about high executive pay (see, e.g., articles 
in The New York Times and The Economist).1 Piketty and Saez (2003) show that the increase in wealth 
concentration is “due to the very large rise of top wages since the 1970s.” Consequently, policy makers 
frequently discuss a limited tax deductibility of executive compensation as a means to curb executive 
compensation or moderate social income inequalities. Second, our paper is directly related to the 
literature on executive pay (Bird 2018) and tax incidence (e.g., Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini 
2012; Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch 2018). We complement this literature by examining whether corporate 
taxes and, in our case, the increase in the corporate tax rate stemming from limited deductibility are 
borne by executives. Our results are thus also informative for the recent U.S. tax change. 
While policy makers have clear intentions when limiting deductibility (reducing executive 
compensation or social inequalities), the theoretical implications of a comprehensive deductibility limit 
are ambiguous. Since executives provide a very specific, important skill set to firms (e.g., Gabaix and 
Landier 2008; Terviö 2008; Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen 2012), the labor supply of managers is very 
elastic, whereas the labor demand of firms is relatively inelastic. Theory suggests that firms are therefore 
unable to decrease executive compensation. Hence, firms’ shareholders and other stakeholders 
theoretically bear the additional tax burden from the limited deductibility. In contrast, other models of 
                                                     
1 The New York Times, “Letter from Washington: As U.S. rich–poor gap grows, so does public outcry,” February 
2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/world/americas/18iht-letter.4637416.html [11/30/2018]; The 
Economist, “Executive Pay in Europe—Pay Attention,” June 2008, https://www.economist.com/ 
business/2008/06/12/pay-attention [last accessed 11/30/2018]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403486
 3 
 
tax incidence (e.g., Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini 2012; Devereux and Maffini 2012; Fuest, 
Peichl, and Siegloch 2018) suggest that, because of their bargaining power, managers participate in the 
firm’s profits, and thus bear part of the tax incidence. Since a higher effective corporate tax rate reduces 
after-tax profits, these models predict decreases in compensation. Hence, firms could reduce executive 
remuneration to pass on part of the corporate tax to the executive.2 We further corroborate the ambiguity 
of the theory in a simple principal–agent model that explicitly models the impact of tax deductibility 
limits on executive compensation. Altogether, the question of whether a comprehensive tax deductibility 
limit for compensation affects executive remuneration is ultimately an empirical one. 
To examine how corporate taxes affect executive compensation, we use the unanticipated tax 
law change in Austria in 2014. Austria’s compensation policy, institutional environment, and economic 
conditions are comparable to those of other European countries and the U.S. As an OECD country, 
Austria follows the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, as do Canada, the U.S., and the U.K. 
As in most countries, executive compensation in Austria comprises performance and non–performance-
based components (Murphy 2013). Prior to 2014, all compensation components were tax deductible in 
Austria. Following the federal elections in Austria in 2013, the newly formed government, in a surprise 
move to the public and the markets, announced the introduction of limited tax deductibility for any type 
of compensation exceeding EUR 500,000 per employee per year. Given the average compensation of 
board members and executives, this can add up to a sizable amount of additional tax burden for the firm. 
As mentioned above, the tax burden increases by approximately 4%.3 This significant economic tax 
increase on executive labor induced by the 2014 reform that cannot be circumvented by shifting 
compensation components from higher- to lower-taxed components provides a suitable setting to test 
whether executives or firms bear the corporate tax burden. We exploit this setting in a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach, since some executives are affected by this rule, while others are not.4 
                                                     
2 We note that the companies then risk reduced executive performance, due to fewer financial incentives and the 
decreased alignment of interests (Holmström 1979). The bargaining models above typically do not include the 
incentive component.  
3  The average executive board of Austrian companies comprises four members with an average salary of 
EUR 1,000,000 if they are affected by the rule. This adds up to EUR 2,000,000 in non-deductible compensation 
per firm. Considering the Austrian corporate income tax rate of 25%, the average affected firm faces an additional 
tax burden of EUR 500,000 for their four board members (or EUR 125,000 per board member, or 12.5% of the 
total compensation). 
4 We find support for the assumption that treated and control executives follow a common trend prior to 2014. 
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We collect data on executive compensation for all listed, disclosing Austrian firms from their 
annual statements and disclosures over the period from 2012 to 2017. During this period, the corporate 
tax rate remained constant and corporate as well as income tax laws did not change significantly, except 
for the introduction of the tax deductibility limit. We combine these data with financial statement 
information from Worldscope. In our initial tests, we find that Austrian executives affected by the limit 
experienced lower growth in total pay relative to unaffected executives. This result is an indication that 
managers appear to bear part of the corporate tax and that corporate taxes can affect executive 
compensation (see also Bird 2018).  
One concern about this DiD analysis is that we cannot control for general global trends in 
executive compensation between executives with higher remuneration relative to those with lower levels 
of compensation. In other words, our results from Austria could just reflect a general trend in converging 
compensation across firms during the sample period. To account for such trends, we augment our dataset 
with executive-level data on executive board members from Germany, the U.S., the U.K., and France. 
Our main empirical analysis uses thus triple-difference settings, comparing the trend between treated 
and control executives in these countries with that in Austria to account for the general trend. The 
findings are striking: our significant results from the Austrian setting disappear. That is, the results we 
obtain for Austrian firms in isolation simply reflect a general trend in executive compensation. There is 
no discernible change in executive compensation when the tax law limits the tax deductibility of 
executives’ labor expense.  
This finding is robust to a battery of robustness and sensitivity tests. First, we continue to find 
this insignificant result when using a matching approach that eliminates differences, for example, in firm 
size between treated and control groups. Second, we examine whether the effect is similar for newly 
signed contracts because existing contracts might be sticky. We still find no discernible change in 
executive compensation for newly signed contracts. Third, we allow for lagged reform effects as it might 
take some time for the limited tax deductibility to change contracts. Fourth, we employ less restrictive 
fixed effects structures. Fifth, we require a balanced panel to avoid that entries and exits drive our results. 
In all these test, we still find no effect of the limited tax deductibility on executive compensation.  
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We also provide several cross-sectional analyses with respect to differences in the labor supply 
elasticity of executives. While the average effect could be insignificant, executives with a less elastic 
labor supply could bear part of the corporate tax burden. We examine three different cross sections that 
intend to exploit differences in executives’ labor supply elasticity. First, we compare the compensation 
of CEOs versus that of other executives. Second, we split the sample based on executives’ tenure, age, 
and the firm’s return on assets (ROA). Finally, we compare firms with higher versus lower profitability. 
In none of the subsamples do we find evidence of executive compensation being affected by corporate 
taxes. It therefore appears as if executives, irrespective of their level, tenure, age, or performance, have 
sufficient labor market power to avoid having the corporate tax burden passed on to them. Our results 
indicate that corporate taxes have no effect on executive compensation. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical argument that, because of executives’ high labor market power, firms cannot pass on the 
corporate tax burden to executives. 
In the final step, we examine whether shareholders bear the burden of the corporate tax on 
executives. Shareholders could bear the cost of the corporate tax, since firms could reduce dividends or 
capital investments, or tap internal resources by reducing financial slack. We find no evidence that firms 
reduce dividends or investments. Instead, our results indicate that affected Austrian firms reduce 
precautionary savings, that is, reduce financial slack. Cash holdings are high-discretion financial 
resources, which enable managerial flexibility (George 2005). This strategy is potentially costly for 
shareholders, since reducing existing financial buffers predisposes firms to economic shocks (e.g., 
Latham and Braun 2008) and hostile takeovers (e.g., Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007), and reduces 
internal funds to finance large future investments (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004). Hence, 
shareholders appear to bear the corporate tax burden of taxing executives through reduced cash holdings. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we contribute to the literature on 
corporate taxes and executive compensation (Hall and Liebman 2000; Rose and Wolfram 2000; Ehrlich 
and Radulescu 2017; Bird 2018). In a setting where the limited deductibility of executive compensation 
cannot be avoided, we show that in contrast to setting which allow for substitution between 
compensation components (e.g., Bird 2018), corporate taxes have no discernible impact on executive 
compensation. The changes in Austrian compensation between affected and unaffected executives 
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reflect only a general global trend in executive compensation. In other words, executives do not bear the 
burden of the corporate tax. Instead, the additional corporate tax burden is (at least partly) borne by 
shareholders in the form of reduced cash holdings. 
Second, our paper thus relates to the literature on the incidence of corporate taxes in general and 
of labor tax costs specifically (Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini 2012; Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch 
2018). While the theory on the incidence of corporate taxes falling on executives is ambiguous, our 
results indicate that executives do not bear the corporate tax burden. Hence, any policy attempt to reduce 
executive compensation by changing the corporate tax code might not be successful because of 
executives’ labor market power. Our results thus have policy implications, since politicians regularly 
discuss changing the corporate tax law and implications for potential papers examining the extension to 
Section 162(m) in the course of the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 that limits tax deductibility of 
executive compensation. Our results suggest that such attempts might not be successful. Hence, policy 
makers might consider other approaches, such as increased personal income taxes, as proposed by 
Piketty (2014) and Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014). 
2 Predictions and Institutional Background 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Compensation Policy in Austria 
We exploit the introduction of a tax deductibility limit in Austria to identify whether firms pass 
on an increase in tax costs to their executives in the form of lower wages. In our empirical approach, we 
compare the executive compensation of Austrian firms to the executive compensation of German, U.S., 
U.K., and French firms. Austria is comparable to our set of control countries, as well as many other 
countries, in many respects. First, all the countries in our sample are members of the OECD and, 
therefore, follow the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, making them comparable in terms of 
corporate governance. According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, a special committee 
of the board comprised either wholly or mostly of independent directors shall be responsible for setting 
and negotiating executive compensation and contracts for board members and key executives.5 While 
                                                     
5 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, VI. D. 4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with 
the longer-term interests of the company and its shareholders, https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264236882-en.pdf?expires=1542287638&id=id&accname=ocid177428& 
checksum=AF3A76B6D81F6A5A07508351FE6ACBEB [last accessed 11/15/2018]. 
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the formal organization of firms’ management and directors differs across our set of countries, corporate 
governance across all countries should ensure no potential conflicts of interest between management 
and the committee responsible for executive compensation. For example, like German publicly listed 
firms, Austrian publicly listed firms are organized in a two-tier system, with strict separation of the 
executive and supervisory boards (Jungmann 2009; Block and Gerstner 2016). While the executive 
board manages the firm, the supervisory board appoints, dismisses, and monitors the members of the 
executive board. In contrast, U.K. and U.S. firms are traditionally organized in a one-tier system in 
which executive and non-executive members constitute the board mostly in equal parts (Jungmann 
2009); however, as in the two-tier German and Austrian systems, non-executive members and 
independent directors evaluate the firm’s strategy and monitor executives, comparable to the supervisory 
board mandated for German and Austrian firms (Block and Gerstner 2016). In France, firms can choose 
between a one- and a two-tier board structure, the former being more popular (Millet-Reyes and Zhao 
2010). While firms are potentially organized differently, executive compensation is effectively set 
similarly across the chosen countries. More importantly, comparable to German, U.S., U.K., and French 
compensation packages, Austrian executive compensation comprises fixed and short-term as well as 
long-term variable pay (Murphy 2013). Thus, Austria shares institutional features with other countries 
in terms of setting executive compensation. 
Austria is also comparable in terms of corporate taxation to Germany, the U.S., the U.K., and 
France. Executive compensation is commonly considered a tax-deductible operating expense at the firm 
level for firms in Germany, the U.K., and France, whereas the U.S. introduced a tax deductibility limit 
on non–performance-based compensation exceeding USD 1,000,000 as early as 1993. Thus, the tax 
treatment of executive compensation does not change during our sample period in any sample country, 
except in Austria, the shock we exploit for identification. In addition, corporate tax rates and, thus, the 
after-tax cost of executive compensation are similar across our sample countries. While Austrian firms 
face a 25% corporate tax rate, German firms face a combined corporate tax rate of approximately 30%. 
The corporate tax rate in France was 33.33% in 2014, and the U.K. levied 21% before April 2014, 20% 
in 2015, and then 19% as of 2016. The U.S. levied corporate taxes at a federal corporate tax rate of 35% 
until 2017. In 2010, the U.K. as well as France levied an increased tax on bonus payments in certain 
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financial institutions.6 Taken together, Austrian tax rules on executive compensation are comparable to 
those of the other countries in our sample prior to 2014, despite minor differences in tax rates. 
Lastly, Austria is comparable to Germany, the U.S., the U.K, and France in terms of economic 
development, such as productivity, inflation, political stability, rule of law, and corruption. Overall, in 
terms of institutions regulating executive compensation and economic development, Austria is 
comparable to the other countries in our sample, as well as outside our sample. 
2.2 Tax Deductibility Reform in Austria 
Austrian firms could fully deduct wages, including executive compensation, for corporate tax 
purposes until 2014. As of 2014, any executive compensation exceeding EUR 500,000 is no longer tax 
deductible. The limit comprises all types of compensation components, such as fixed pay, variable pay, 
pay in kind, and other fringe benefits. The reform was implemented swiftly (see Figure 1). Initiated in 
July 2013, when the campaigns for the Austrian election started, the Social Democratic Party of Austria 
(SPÖ)—one of the major political parties in Austria—included plans to introduce a tax deductibility 
limit in their election program.  
Although plans to introduce a tax deductibility limit on executive pay were public six months 
before finally entering into force at the start of 2014, its ultimate implementation at that time was far 
from certain for the following reasons. First, the reform was initially intended to be restricted to firms 
with close ties to the state (“state-near firms”)7 and was not at the top of the SPÖ’s political agenda. 
Second, the outcome of the Austrian election in terms of potential coalitions and majorities was far from 
certain in 2013. Both major parties, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the SPÖ, fought a head-to-
head race in the polls. Thus, the reform’s implementation was not predictable for firms until its final 
implementation, when the newly elected Austrian government surprisingly introduced the tax 
deductibility limit for any compensation exceeding EUR 500,000. In February 2014, the new 
government passed the Tax Code Amendment Act (Abgabenänderungsgesetz), including the tax 
deductibility limit, which was no longer restricted to state-near firms but was applicable to all Austrian 
firms. It took another year for the reform’s ultimate legal certainty. The reform was challenged in 2014, 
                                                     
6 Due to these bonus taxes and surcharges, we exclude the executives of financial institutions from our sample. 
7  SPÖ 2013 election program, project 19, https://www.mehr-demokratie.at/sites/default/files/PDF/spoe_wahl-
programm_2013.pdf [last accessed 11/15/2018]. 
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and the Austrian Federal Fiscal Court declared the reform unlawful in August 20148 but it was ultimately 
upheld by the Austrian Constitutional Court at the beginning of 2015.9 The shift of payments into the 
future is neither possible nor sensible, as the deductibility limit maintains for pensions.10 The tax 
deductibility limit also comprises all types of compensation, including fixed pay, variable pay, and pay 
in kind and other fringe benefits, leaving no room to avoid the tax increase through shifts in 
compensation components.11 
The Austrian legislator justified the reform, with reference to “increasing income 
differentials,”12 which was not equally well received. While the Austrian Chamber of Labor valued the 
reform as a “first important step to implement appropriate executive remuneration,” the Austrian 
Federation of Industries criticized the reform as “raid-like” and “harming Austria as a business 
location.”13 The Austrian newspaper Der Standard stated that the deductibility limit in Austria was 
arbitrarily chosen and impedes competitiveness.14 The rule was also economically relevant to listed 
Austrian firms increasing tax payments of about 4% of average corporate taxes paid (see footnote 3).  
Important for our identification strategy, personal tax rates as well as corporate tax rates did not 
change contemporaneously. A couple of years later, in 2016, there was a change to personal income tax 
rates on income such as wages. However, the adjustment is negligible for most of our sample executives. 
For example, an executive with an income of € 1 million experienced a very small decrease in personal 
income taxes of about € 2,400. Compared to the impact of the limited deductibility on the corporate tax 
bill of € 125,000, the income tax changes in 2016 are very unlikely to drive our results.15 For three 
                                                     
8  Federal Fiscal Court’s action report, https://www.bfg.gv.at/BFG_Taetigkeitsbericht_2014.pdf?61ee19 [last 
accessed 30/10/2018]. 
9 Austrian Constitutional Court 12/9/2014, G 136/2014, ÖBA 2015/42 (VfGH). 
10  Income Tax Guidelines (Einkommensteuerrichtlinien) 14.8a.1, 4852b, and 4852d: https://findok.bmf.gv.at/ 
findok?execution=e3s2#segmentHeadline1 [last accessed 03/22/2019]. 
11 Additionally, intentional evasion of the tax increase through artificial arrangements can be challenged by the 
Austrian tax authorities according to the General Anti-Avoidance Regulation (§22 BAO), for which executive 
compensation levels are salient information and relatively easy to audit at low cost.  
12 Explanations of the political intentions behind the Austrian reform can be found at Z5 and Z12 lit c. (§20. Abs. 
1 Z 7 and § 124b Z 253 EStG 1988) AbgÄG 2014, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/I/I_00024/ 
fname_337614.pdf [last accessed 10/17/2018]. 
13 Kurier, on the deductibility limit of compensation, https://kurier.at/wirtschaft/managergehaelter-steuermalus-ab-
500-000-euro-zulaessig/108.053.061 [last accessed 10/20/2018]. 
14 Der Standard, on the deductibility limit of compensation, https://derstandard.at/2000010442814/Gegen-Steuer-
Malus-fuer-Manager [last accessed 10/13/2018]. 
15 For very high incomes (well above € 2 million), higher marginal tax rates might lead to higher personal income 
tax burdens, which in turn might affect executive compensation.  
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reasons, we are confident that the 2016 changes are unlikely to explain our results. First, the effect of 
the corporate tax is always larger than the change in the personal income tax for any level of income. 
Second, in our sample, the personal tax effect is negligibly small as about 90% (75%) of executives in 
Austria earn less than € 1.5 (1.0) million. Third, in untabulated test, we show that our results are robust 
to the exclusion of Austrian executives with incomes above € 1 million. In this sample, the 2016 change 
in personal taxes cannot explain the effect of the 2014 Austrian tax reform. 
Even though the legislation change of the limited deductibility was subject to harsh criticism in 
Austria, other countries implemented similar tax changes. For example, in 2017, the U.S. Tax Cuts and 
Job Act expanded the existing deductibility limit to all compensation components (Kastiel and Noked 
2018). However, since personal income tax rates, tax credits, tax deductions and, in particular, the 
corporate tax rate as well as the definition of the corporate tax base changed substantially, isolating the 
effect of the limited deductibility using the U.S. setting and the U.S. Tax Cuts and Job Act is empirically 
challenging. We therefore use the Austrian case to inform the debate about taxes and executive pay. 
2.3 Effect of Limited Deductibility on Executive Compensation and Firm Performance 
This section outlines the theoretical effects of corporate taxes on executive compensation. 
Executive compensation is considered a tax-deductible operating expense at the firm level in virtually 
all tax systems and decreases the firm’s tax burden and effective tax rate. The introduction of a tax 
deductibility limit on executive compensation therefore increases the firm’s effective tax rate. However, 
firms can pass on part of the additional tax burden to their executives in the form of lower wages, to 
shield shareholders from the additional nominal tax burden.  
Prior research suggests that firms can pass on at least part of the economic burden of a corporate 
tax increase to their employees in the form of lower wages (e.g., Felix 2009; Arulampalam, Devereux, 
and Maffini 2012; Liu and Altshuler 2013; Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch 2018) or to customers in the form 
of higher consumer prices (e.g., Vasquez-Ruiz 2011). Whereas the ability to shift the economic burden 
of the tax is mainly shaped by the firm’s relative market power in the labor or product market (Harberger 
1962; Fullerton and Metcalf 2002), the ability to shift the economic burden of the tax increase in the 
form of lower executive compensation is also determined by its effects on the alignment of incentives 
between shareholders and executives (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmström 1979). Thus, firms 
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can trade off the benefits of passing on the tax burden to their executives against the associated agency 
costs of a lower degree of incentive alignment between management and shareholders. The extent to 
which firms can theoretically pass on the additional tax burden therefore depends on the trade-off 
between tax benefits and associated agency costs. 
On the one hand, the introduction of a tax deductibility limit can result in comparably lower 
compensation for executives. Provided firms have more market power in the labor market relative to 
executives, firms can pass on the additional tax burden to their executives. Recent research suggests that 
executive compensation and hence their market or bargaining power vary with executive characteristics. 
For example, executive compensation is positively correlated with executives’ firm experience 
(Graham, Li, and Qui 2012) or age (Daily, Certo, and Dalton 2000). Hence, younger and less 
experienced executives potentially have lower relative market power in the executive labor market 
compared to older and more experienced executives, increasing the firm’s ability to shift the additional 
tax burden toward less powerful executives.  
Shifting the tax burden toward executives in the form of lower compensation, firms trade off 
these benefits against the associated agency costs of lower incentive alignment between shareholders 
and executives, such as decreased work effort, reduced firm profits, or, ultimately, manager resignation. 
The associated agency costs vary with the degree to which the manager’s effort and, ultimately, firm 
performance are negatively affected by a reduction in executive compensation. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003, 2004, 2005) argue that managers are able to extract rents when negotiating compensation levels 
beyond those that would be optimal to align executive and shareholder incentives (see also Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker 1999; Hope and Thomas 2008). For example, Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson 
(2005) show that weaker shareholder rights are associated with more favorable executive compensation. 
Hence, if managers are excessively paid ex ante or have other means available to extract rents, a 
reduction in executive compensation results in comparably low agency costs for the firm. Bird (2018), 
for example, shows that executive compensation decreased following the abolishment of a large tax 
incentive on stock option pay in Canada, suggesting that the tax benefit associated with managers’ stock 
option pay was entirely passed on to executives before. Overall, provided that executives have relatively 
less market power in the labor market compared to firms and/or the firm’s associated agency costs to 
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reduce executive compensation are comparably low, the introduction of a tax deductibility limit could 
result in a reduction of executive compensation. Also, we observe low mobility in Austrian board 
members, with hardly any Austrian being a board member in a German DAX firm. The lack of outside 
options might further enable firms to pass on the tax burden to executives. 
On the other hand, executive compensation could also remain unaffected following the 
introduction of a tax deductibility limit. Provided executives have more market power relative to firms 
in the executive labor market or the agency costs associated with a reduction in executive compensation 
are comparably high, firms have fewer incentives to pass on the tax burden in the form of lower 
executive compensation. Prior research provides evidence that the economic burden of a corporate tax 
increase is less likely to be passed on to high-skilled employees (e.g., Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch 2018). 
Executives, for example, provide a skill set that is valuable for specific firms (e.g., Gabaix and Landier 
2008; Terviö 2008; Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen 2012), and firms might not want to risk their 
dismissal due to lower executive compensation or reduced firm performance (Denis and Denis 1995; 
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004; Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon 2010; Jenter and 
Lewellen 2017). In other words, executives are indispensable to the firm, suggesting that executives 
have market power in the executive labor market, reducing firms’ ability to pass on the economic burden 
of the tax. Executive compensation can also remain unaffected if the increased agency costs associated 
with a reduction in executive compensation are excessively high. A reduction in executive 
compensation, for example, can result in higher agency costs, provided the previous compensation 
schemes optimally aligned the incentives of shareholders and executives. Hence, provided executives 
have relatively high levels of market power in the labor market and/or the agency costs associated with 
a reduction in executive compensation are relatively high, executive compensation will remain 
unchanged following the introduction of a tax deductibility limit. 
Our previous discussion shows that the theoretical predictions provide ambiguous results. To 
further corroborate these ambiguous predictions, in Appendix A.1, we present a simple moral hazard 
LEN model with managerial bargaining power to demonstrate how limited deductibility affects 
executive compensation. The model implications are qualitatively similar when assuming that executive 
compensation is linked either to pre-tax or after-tax profitability. In general, the executive’s 
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remuneration would decrease only if the executive’s bargaining power falls below a certain threshold, 
dependent on the manager’s risk aversion and the impact of external factors on the firm’s performance 
goal. Otherwise, the introduction of a deductibility limit would have no effect on wage development. 
Collectively, prior theoretical literature as well as our simple moral hazard model yield ambiguous 
predictions with respect to executive compensation. Ultimately, it is an empirical question. Since the 
theoretical implications are mixed, we state our main hypothesis in null form as follows. 
Hypothesis 1:  Executive compensation does not decrease following the limitation of the tax 
deductibility of executive compensation. 
3 Empirical Approach and Data 
3.1 Identification and Empirical Specification 
To test if firms pass on the economic burden of the limited tax deductibility to their executives, 
we exploit variation in the tax costs for executive labor at the firm level. In 2014, Austria restricted the 
tax deductibility of (executive) compensation to EUR 500,000. Firms face limited tax deductibility of 
executive compensation if the executive earns more than EUR 500,000 per year. We therefore split the 
sample into executives affected by the reform (ܴܶܧܣܶ ൌ 1), who earn more than EUR 500,000 yearly, 
and executives who are not affected by the reform (ܴܶܧܣܶ ൌ 0). We then use a DiD approach where 
we compare the changes in compensation between these groups (first difference) before and after the 
reform (second difference). If affected executives earn less than their unaffected peers after the 
introduction of the tax deductibility limit, the tax incidence of the burden of the limited tax deductibility 
would fall on executives in the form of lower compensation. We thus estimate the following equation: 
lnሺܲܽݕሻ௜,௧ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൈ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൅ ߜ	 ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߤ௧
൅ ߩ௜ ൅ ߳௜,௧,	 
(1) 
where lnሺܲܽݕሻ is the natural logarithm of the total compensation of executive i in year t. We additionally 
estimate equation (1) using fixed and variable compensation as dependent variables. The variable 
ܴܶܧܣܶ is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the executive earns more than EUR 500,000 
yearly in 2012 and 2013, and zero otherwise. As the reform was enacted rapidly, with just two months 
between the announcement and its entry into force, we do not expect any anticipation effects by firms. 
We therefore base the treatment status on pre-reform compensation levels. The reform sorts 
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approximately 45% of the executive–year observations into the group of unaffected executives and 55% 
into the group of affected executives. The variable ܴܧܨܱܴܯ is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one for years in which the tax deductibility limit applies (2014 onward), and zero otherwise. If the 
Austrian reform were to reduce executive compensation, we would obtain a negative β3 coefficient. 
In our empirical analysis, we additionally control for variables that likely positively affect 
executive compensation (e.g., Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005; Edmans and Gabaix 2016; Bird 2018). 
Hence, ܺ is a vector of control variables that includes firm size, Size, and a set of firm performance 
measures, including lagged ROA, lagged stock return (Return), and the market-to-book (MTBV). The 
vector ܺ also includes executive-level control variables such as the indicator variable CEO, which takes 
the value of one if the executive in question acts as the CEO (and zero otherwise), the executive’s age 
(Age), and firm experience in years (FirmExperience). All variables are defined in Table 1. We use both 
year fixed effects ߤ௧ and executive fixed effects ߩ௜, respectively, to control for time- and executive-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We cluster standard errors at the executive level (Petersen 2009). 
One concern about our analysis is that there are global trends in executive compensation that 
are uncorrelated with Austrian tax law changes. To the extent that these global trends also affect Austrian 
firms, our coefficient of interest, β3, could pick up these trends. We therefore estimate our DiD 
specification for several other countries that did not introduce a tax deductibility limit but which are 
subject to the same general trends. In particular, we choose Germany, the U.S., the U.K., and France to 
obtain a broader picture of the development of compensation in Europe and the U.S. Germany shares its 
language and borders with Austria, and its executive remuneration evolved similarly before the reform 
year 2014. The U.K. and France are separated from Austria by both language and spatially, so that any 
spillover effects are unlikely. We include the U.S. as an important non-European benchmark. Since these 
countries did not introduce a tax deductibility limit as Austria implemented in 2014, we can account for 
general global compensation trends by splitting the executives in these countries as well into groups of 
pseudo-affected and pseudo-unaffected executives. 
We mimic the Austrian reform in all non-reform countries and categorize executives earning 
more than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013 as treated (ܴܶܧܣܶ ൌ 1ሻ . In countries with average 
compensation levels well beyond EUR 500,000, such as Germany or France in our sample, setting the 
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pseudo-threshold at EUR 500,000 would yield very small groups of unaffected executives serving as a 
control group. In this case, we construct pseudo-reform thresholds within non-reform countries to sort 
approximately 55% of the executives into the affected group and 45% into the unaffected group. This 
proportion mirrors the distribution of affected and unaffected executive–year observations in the reform 
country of Austria. We implement this so-called distribution-like pseudo-reform in Germany and 
France. The pseudo-thresholds are set to EUR 1.8 million and EUR 1.7 million, respectively. In the U.S. 
and the U.K., we use a cutoff of EUR 500,000, consistent with Austria, by converting compensation in 
local currency to euros.16 
We then extend specification (1) to a triple-difference estimator that compares relative changes 
in compensation between affected and unaffected executives in Austria (first difference) to relative 
changes in compensation between pseudo-affected and pseudo-unaffected executives in non-reform 
countries (second difference) around 2014 (third difference). Therefore, we compare relative 
compensation changes not only within countries, but also across countries for further robustness and to 
isolate the incremental effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on the compensation levels of 
executives. Empirically, we implement the triple-difference estimator as follows: 
lnሺܲܽݕሻ௜,௧ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚସ ܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൈ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧
൅ ߚହ	ܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൈ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚ଻	ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧
ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߜ	 ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߩ௜ ൅ ߳௜,௧,  
(2) 
where all the variables are the same as in specification (1) and ܣܶ is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the executive in question is at an Austrian firm, and zero otherwise. The coefficient ߚସ captures up the 
relative difference in compensation levels in the reform period (first difference) between affected and 
unaffected executives (second difference) in countries other than Austria. This coefficient thus captures 
the general trend in compensation between these groups. Our coefficient of interest is ߚହ, which captures 
the incremental change of the executive compensation of Austrian treated firms (third difference). If the 
Austrian tax change indeed “has teeth” and reduces executive compensation, then ߚହ should be negative 
and statistically significant. 
                                                     
16 To demonstrate that our arguably somewhat arbitrary cutoff choice is not responsible for our findings, we also 
implement so-called distribution-like pseudo-reforms in all the other countries (the U.S. and the U.K.) for 
additional robustness in the Online Appendix, Tables A.1 to A.3. 
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One potential concern about our approach is that our fixed effects structure with executive fixed 
effects is too tight to identify the effect of limited tax deductibility on executive pay. We therefore 
replicate our main results without these fixed effects. As reported in Table A.4 of the Online Appendix, 
our results are insensitive to the exclusion of executive fixed effects. Hence, the main inferences that we 
draw with these fixed effects also hold without these fixed effects.  
3.2 Data and Sample 
Our empirical analysis rests on a sample comprising data on executive compensation (total, fixed, 
and variable pay) and demographic characteristics (age, firm tenure, and CEO status) from 2012 to 2017, 
including 119 executives of Austrian firms, 167 executives of German firms, 6,368 executives of U.S. 
firms, 1,226 executives of U.K. firms, and 24 executives of French firms. Since listed firms in Austria 
are only required to disclose overall individual board member pay data since 2012, our sample period is 
naturally restricted to 2012.17 Data for the executives of U.S. firms were retrieved from ExecuComp. 
Data for the executives of U.K. and French firms were retrieved from BoardEx.18 Additionally, we hand-
collected the compensation and characteristics data of Austrian and German executives and firms to 
ensure better data coverage for the reform country, Austria, and the most similar non-reform country in 
terms of language and institutions (Germany). In particular, data coverage of Austria is poor in 
commercially available databases. We therefore collected data from audited financial disclosures. 
Whereas the disclosure of overall executive compensation levels has been mandatory since 2012, the 
breakdown by fixed and variable compensation is only recommended.19 However, the majority of listed 
Austrian firms disclose granular data for the annual compensation of their executives. Our data therefore 
comprise detailed information on executives’ annual remuneration, including fixed, variable, other, and 
total compensation, as well as their demographic characteristics, such as age, board, and firm tenure, 
and their role on the board for all 54 listed Austrian firms that disclose individual pay data. 
                                                     
17  Changes of the Austrian Corporate Governance Code 2012, https://www.corporate-
governance.at/uploads/u/corpgov/files/code/corporate-governance-code-072012.pdf [03/22/2019]; §239 1 4 UGB 
(Austrian Commercial Code). 
18 The BoardEx data are very detailed, especially for the U.K., and comparable in coverage to ExecuComp.  
19 Austrian Corporate Governance Code comply-or-explain rule 31 https://www.corporate-
governance.at/uploads/u/corpgov/files/code/corporate-governance-code-012018.pdf [10/31/2018]; German 
Corporate Governance Code 4.2, https://www.dcgk.de/en/code/current-version/management-board.html [last 
accessed 10/31/2018]. 
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To arrive at the final sample including the other countries, we start with the universe of BoardEx 
and ExecuComp observations (111,417 executive–year observations). We then link our executive data 
to firm-level financial data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. In this step, we 
lose 47,921 executive–year observations due to missing firm-level financials (total assets, stock returns 
for the end of the financial year, pre-tax income, and market-to-book values). However, this allows us 
to control for the effect of firm performance on executive compensation levels. Additionally, we require 
non-missing values for total, fixed, and variable compensation (dropping 7,345 executive–year 
observations). Finally, we require compensation data for at least our pre-reform periods, 2012 and 
2013,20 and one post-reform year, 2014, for each executive. We lose 17,960 executive–year observations 
in this necessary step, because the assignment to the treatment and control groups needs to be carried 
out with pre-reform values. We winsorize all continuous variables at the first and 99th percentiles. Table 
2 summarizes all the steps performed per country. Our final sample comprises 7,951 executives and 
38,288 executive–year observations. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the compensation levels, firm-level performance 
measures, and executive-level characteristics for each country. Executives of firms in Austria earn, on 
average, EUR 799,770 per year, are 52.71 years old, and have spent 14.44 years with the firm (Panel 
A). A total of 29% of the executives in the sample of Austrian firms act as the CEO. The total 
compensation of Austrian firm executives is almost equally divided between fixed pay (on average 
EUR 388.230) and variable pay (on average EUR 338.960). Austrian executives unaffected by the 
reform (with total compensation under than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013) are, on average, 4.22 years 
younger and have, on average, 2.69 years less firm experience than affected executives earning more 
than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013. Unaffected executives work, on average, in smaller firms (Size, 
14.02 < 15.56) with higher profitability (Return, 0.11 > 0.03) compared to their affected counterparts. 
Executive compensation differs slightly across countries (Table 3, Panels B to E). Whereas the 
executives of German and French firms earn, on average, EUR 2.4 million yearly, executives in the U.S. 
(U.K.) earn, on average, EUR 548,700 (EUR 378,910). These differences in total compensation are 
                                                     
20 We intentionally require two available pre-reform periods (2012 and 2013) to ensure that changes in variable 
compensation levels with firm performance have less of an impact on our treatment assignment. The treatment 
assignment is explained in detail in the next section.  
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mainly attributable to differences in firm size (Size) across countries in the sample. German and French 
firms are significantly larger (Size = 17.64 and 16.75, respectively) than the U.S. and U.K. firms (Size = 
14.83 and 11.61, respectively) in the sample. The share of fixed pay relative to total compensation varies 
from 35% in the U.K. to 87% in the U.S. The average age of firm executives in non-reform countries 
ranges from 52.94 years in the U.K. to 58.42 years in France. 
To mitigate potential effects of differences across subsamples on our empirical estimation, we 
additionally match our covariates (Size, ROA, Return, and MTBV), using entropy balancing 
(Hainmueller 2010) across all countries. Table 4 shows that the remaining differences in Size, ROA, 
Return, and MTBV across countries are insignificant after entropy balancing. All our empirical tests are 
performed using the main sample, as well as the matched sample. 
3.3 Parallel Trends Assumption 
A crucial requirement for our empirical identification is that executive compensation evolved 
uniformly over time before the reform in 2014 (parallel trends assumption; see, e.g., Roberts and Whited 
2012). We perform the following analyses to check whether the parallel trends assumption holds in our 
setting. Figure 2 presents the growth in total compensation over time of the unaffected (control) 
executives and affected (treatment) executives for each country. Overall, in each country, total 
compensation grew by a factor of one to two from 2012 to 2017. This result provides first evidence of a 
global trend in executive compensation during the sample period. Although the compensation levels of 
(pseudo-)affected executives in the sample are, on average, two to five times higher than those of 
unaffected executives, Figure 2 provides graphical evidence that compensation evolved uniformly in the 
pre-reform period for the executives of Austrian, German, U.S., and U.K. firms. Only the executive 
compensation levels of French firms evolved somewhat differently in the pre-reform period, which 
could be attributable to the small sample size. In Figures A.1 and A.2, we replicate these statistics using 
fixed pay and variable pay, respectively. The inferences are similar the ones for total pay. 
Additionally, we provide statistical evidence that executive compensation evolved uniformly 
before 2014 between the treatment and control groups. In Figure 3, Panel A, we plot the annual DiD 
coefficients for the pre-reform period (2012 and 2013) for each non-reform country. Note that the 
coefficients indicate relative change in the pre-reform period across groups. The vertical confidence 
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intervals indicate no significant relative change between groups in the pre-reform period, and the 
coefficient is close to zero for the majority of the non-reform countries. In Panel B, we also plot the 
triple-difference coefficient. Overall, the parallel trends assumption appears to holds in our sample. 
4 Results 
4.1 Effect of the Reform on Executives’ Compensation Levels 
We start our empirical analysis by examining the effects of limiting the tax deductibility of labor 
expenses on executive compensation levels in Austria, using the DiD approach from equation (1). In 
Panel A of Table 5, we report the results for the reform country, Austria, using total pay (column (1)), 
fixed pay (column (2)), and variable pay (column (3)) as the dependent variable. The results are striking: 
executives within the scope of the reform earn, on average, 21.7 percent less in the reform period relative 
to their peers outside the scope of the reform. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The difference in compensation levels between executives within and outside the scope of the reform is 
mainly attributable to differences in variable pay in the reform period. The coefficient on variable pay 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level and it is also economically comparable to the 
coefficient on total pay. The coefficient on fixed pay is statistically and economically insignificant. Thus, 
executives falling within the scope of the introduced tax deductibility limit appear to earn less after the 
reform relative to their peers outside the scope of the reform. It thus appears at first glance as if managers 
bear the economic burden of the limited tax deductibility. 
To rule out the possibility that this result just reflects a general global trend in compensation, 
we repeat this DiD analysis for the other countries. In Panel A, Table 5, we present the results for 
Germany. Relative to their peers, executives with compensation levels exceeding the set pseudo-
threshold earn, on average, 23.1 percent less in the reform period. The coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Most importantly, the coefficient estimate is economically comparable to 
that for Austria. The picture is very similar in the other non-reform countries. While, in the U.S., 
executives within the scope of the pseudo-reform earn, on average, 10.6 percent less than their peers (p-
value < 1%), the relative difference in the U.K. amounts to 18.6 percent (p-value < 1%). We find similar 
results in France, with economically comparable differences in compensation levels. However, the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant, presumably because of a lack of sufficient observations. Taken 
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together, we find economically comparable income differentials between groups of executives in the 
reform period in countries in which no comparable reform was introduced. Overall, these first results 
indicate that the Austrian response partially captures worldwide trends in compensation growth between 
comparable groups of executives, and not limited tax deductibility. 
To test this claim empirically, we use the triple-difference approach from equation (2). This 
approach allows us to disentangle the incremental reform effect in Austria from global trends. Table 6 
presents the regression results for the incremental effect on the total compensation of executives of 
Austrian firms compared to the executives of German, U.S., U.K., and French firms. The coefficient ߚହ 
of the triple interaction term ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൈ 	ܴܶܧܣ ௜ܶ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ  captures the incremental effect of the 
Austrian tax deductibility limit on the compensation levels of executives in Austria. However, the 
coefficient ߚହ is statistically insignificant across all specifications using the full sample (Panel A) and 
the matched sample (Panel B). Relative to the executives of firms in non-reform countries, the affected 
executives of Austrian firms do not earn significantly less, on average, after the reform. These results 
suggest that the introduction of a deductibility limit had no incremental effect on total compensation 
levels. This result is consistent with the notion that, due to executives’ high labor supply elasticity 
relative to the inelastic labor demand of firms, executives do not bear the corporate tax burden of limited 
tax deductibility. 
So far, we have evaluated total compensation without considering whether the mix of 
compensation can change. We therefore repeat our triple-difference analysis using fixed and variable 
pay separately as dependent variables to examine whether the executives of Austrian firms experienced 
shifts in the compensation components. We use fixed compensation (Table 7) and variable compensation 
(Table 8) as the dependent variables. The results are very similar to our results for total compensation. 
The coefficient β5, which captures the incremental reform effect in Austria, remains statistically 
insignificant when either fixed or variable compensation is the dependent variable. This result holds for 
the full sample (Panel A of Tables 7 and 8) and the matched sample (Panel B of Tables 7 and 8). 
Overall, these results provide evidence that executive compensation is not sensitive to the 
limited tax deductibility. Of the 24 coefficients in Tables 6 to 8 capturing this effect, none is statistically 
different from zero. The results we find for the sample of Austrian firms appear to simply reflect a 
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general trend in executive compensation. Hence, from the baseline results, we cautiously conclude that 
there is no discernible change in executive compensation when the tax law limits the tax deductibility 
of executives’ labor expense. 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
We run two robustness checks to corroborate our finding. The first robustness test addresses 
concern about the actual reform year. Since it took time for the Austrian Supreme Court to confirm the 
reform as constitutional, firms could respond to the tax law change with delay. After the reform was 
introduced in 2014, a court decision regarding the constitutionality of the reform was pending in the 
Austrian Supreme Court until the measure was declared lawful in 2015. Thus, ultimate legal certainty 
was achieved in 2015, potentially affecting firms’ response to the reform. We therefore rerun the triple-
difference approach of equation (2) but define 2015 as the reform year. We run this additional test to 
investigate whether firms reacted later to the reform as a response to the pending decision of the Austrian 
Supreme Court. Table A.5 (A.6) in the Online Appendix summarizes the results for the full (matched) 
sample. The results indicate that, comparable to our main results, the reform did not affect the 
compensation levels of executives in Austria. In fact, the coefficient of interest is statistically 
insignificant in all 12 specifications. 
The second concern is that executives can enter or exit the sample, which could affect our results. 
To address this concern, we re-estimate equation (2) using a balanced panel requiring six years of non-
missing data per executive. Table A.7 (A.8) of the Online Appendix presents the results for the 
(matched) balanced panel. Again, we find no effect of the Austrian tax law on executive compensation. 
The coefficient of interest remains statistically insignificant across all specifications for total or fixed 
compensation. For variable compensation, the β5 coefficient is significant once at the 10% level. In other 
words, out of the 12 regressions, one coefficient is significant at the 10% level. Collectively, these 
robustness tests provide further evidence that the introduction of the tax deductibility limit in Austria in 
2014 did not significantly reduce executives’ compensation levels. These results indicate that the 
increased tax burden of corporations was not passed on to executives in the form of lower wages. 
We additionally test whether the compensation levels in newly concluded executive contracts 
of Austrian firms are lower compared to newly concluded executive contracts of German firms. We 
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define newly signed contracts as contracts that were signed for the first time in our sample period. We 
perform univariate DiD testing and compare the difference in compensation levels between Austrian 
and German newly signed contracts in the pre-reform period to the difference in compensation levels 
between Austrian and German newly signed contracts in the post-reform period. We perform this 
univariate test because our previous empirical specification relies on the pre-reform assignment of 
treatment status and therefore excludes contracts that are newly signed in the post-reform period. 
Figure 4 summarizes the results. The difference in compensation levels between Austrian and German 
newly signed contracts is statistically significant in both the pre- and post-reform periods. However, in 
line with our previous results, the DiD coefficient is statistically insignificant for new contracts. 
4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Effect of Labor Supply Elasticity 
In a final step of the analysis on executive compensation, we go beyond the average response 
and examine cross-sectional variation in the labor supply elasticity. Theory predicts that the effect of 
corporate taxes on manager compensation depends on the relative elasticity of managers relative to 
firms. To test the effect of variations in labor supply elasticity on the sensitivity of compensation levels, 
we investigate cross-sectional differences of executive- and firm-level characteristics. All of these cross 
sections are designed to test differences in the relative elasticity of labor supply and demand. As a first 
test, we include only executives who are CEOs in the sample and re-estimate regression model (2). 
CEOs are potentially more important to the firm and therefore have a stronger position in the labor 
market for executives. We therefore rerun our triple-difference approach from equation (2) but limit the 
sample to CEOs. Panel A of Table A.9 (A.10) presents the regression results using CEO total 
compensation as the dependent variable using the full (matched) sample. 
Provided CEOs have more market power in the labor market and therefore lower labor supply 
elasticity than their non-CEO peers, the firm is even less able to pass on the economic burden of the tax 
increase to its CEO. In this case, the coefficient on the triple interaction term in specification (2) should 
remain statistically insignificant. Comparable to our baseline results, the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term capturing the incremental reform effect in Austria indeed remains statistically 
insignificant across all specifications. In Panel B of Tables A.9 and A.10, we restrict the sample to the 
other executives who could have less labor market power. However, for these individuals as well, we 
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continue to find insignificant coefficients across all specifications. This finding indicates that non-CEOs 
also have sufficiently high labor supply elasticity so that they do not bear the burden induced by the 
limited tax deductibility of executive compensation. 
The second cross section exploits differences in tenure with the firm. Executives with longer 
firm experience have a potentially stronger bargaining position than their less experienced peers 
(Graham, Li, and Qui 2012). We therefore split our sample along the median of firm experience in years 
and re-estimate equation (2) for both subsamples. Table A.11 (A.12) presents the results using the full 
(matched) sample. In line with our previous results, the coefficient of interest, β5, is mainly statistically 
significant in both subsamples (high versus low experience). Of the 24 estimations, only two coefficients 
β5 are negative and statistically significant. The other 22 coefficients are either insignificant (20 
coefficients) or positive and borderline significant (one coefficient). An alternative way to test this 
notion is to split based on the age of the executive (Graham, Li, and Qui 2012). The results for the split 
the sample based on the age are reported in Tables A.13 and A.14 for the full and the matched sample. 
Graham, Li, and Qui (2012) suggest that there is also no difference between younger and older 
executives in the sample. Of the 24 estimated β5 coefficients all coefficients are insignificant. 
Collectively, these results suggest that, independent of the age or tenure of executives, the tax 
deductibility limit has an effect on executive compensation. 
Further, we exploit differences in the profitability of investments. The idea is that executives of 
more (less) successful firms are in a better (worse) bargaining situation. Hence, for the executives of 
less profitable firms, the tax deductibility limit could be binding and lead to a reduction in compensation 
growth. We split the sample into firms having an ROA above the median and firms having an ROA 
below the median. We then estimate equation (2) for both subsamples. The results are presented in 
Tables A.15 and A.16, respectively. In line with our previous results, there are no differences across the 
samples of high- and low-profit firms. The coefficient on the triple interaction term capturing the 
incremental reform effect in Austria remains mainly statistically insignificant. Of the 24 estimated β5 
coefficients, only one is negative and statistically significant. The other 23 coefficients are insignificant, 
suggesting that the executives of less successful firms are also in a strong enough bargaining situation 
and do not experience a reduction in compensation growth. Lastly, we mitigate concerns that reductions 
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in executive compensation growth are limited to top-earning executives. We therefore rerun regression 
model (2) in a subsample of treated executives in the upper median of the income distribution and report 
the results in Tables A.17 and A. 18 for total, fixed, and variable pay using the full and the matched 
sample, respectively. Our previous results collectively hold in this subsample analysis of top-earning 
executives. 
Overall, the previous tests confirm our baseline results that the economic burden of the corporate 
tax is not passed on to executives in the form of lower compensation. These results hold in a variety of 
different subsamples in which we expect cross-sectional differences in the labor supply elasticity of 
executives. It thus appears as if executives have sufficient labor market power to prevent the corporate 
tax burden created by limited tax deductibility from being passed on to them. 
5 Do Firms and Their Shareholders Bear the Burden of the Tax on Executives? 
In the final step, we examine who ultimately bears the burden of the additional tax. As stated 
before, the increased tax burden accounts for no less than approximately 4% of the income taxes payable 
for the Austrian firms in our sample. If executives do not bear the burden of the tax, shareholders or 
other employees could bear the burden of the increase in corporate tax on executives. Shareholders could 
bear the cost of the corporate tax in several testable ways. Firms can reduce dividends or investments in 
capital or research and development (R&D), cut labor expenses on other employees, or tap internal 
resources by reducing financial slack. These strategies have different costs. Although dividend payouts 
are easily adjustable, firms will most likely back away from dividend cuts due to signaling effects (e.g., 
Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 1970; Kalay 1980). Passing on the additional tax burden to a firm’s lower-
level employees could be complicated, as employment protection in Austria is strong. For example, even 
necessary redundancy dismissals must be approved by a third party.21 Cutting investment comes at the 
cost of reduced future sales and growth. Still, previous research suggests that R&D expenses are often 
subject to myopic investment behavior (e.g., Bushee 1998) or real earnings management (e.g., Bange 
and De Bondt 1998), similar to capital expenses (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). 
                                                     
21 Employment Flexibility Index—EU and OECD Countries (2018), https://en.llri.lt/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Employment-Flexibility-Index-2018-LFMI.pdf [last accessed 02/25/2019]. 
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Firms could therefore opt for less salient ways and take from cash reserves. Specifically, firms 
could reduce financial slack, or cash holdings. Contrary to debt, fixed assets, or any excess capacity, 
cash holdings are highly discretionally financial resources that increase managerial flexibility (George 
2005). However, this strategy also bears costs for shareholders, since a reduction of financial buffers 
increases the firm’s risk of environmental turbulence (e.g., Latham and Braun 2008), hostile takeover 
(Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007), and less valuable, large investments (e.g., Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach 2004). Therefore, reducing cash holdings can reduce firm value and shareholders would 
ultimately bear the tax burden of introducing the tax deductibility limit. 
To test if the introduction of the tax deductibility limit has real effects on Austrian firms and 
ultimately their shareholders, we analyze the reform’s effects at the firm level by examining payout, 
investment decisions, as well as financial slack. We perform this analysis at the firm level and estimate 
the following empirical specification that is conceptually comparable to specification (2): 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ	∝ ൅	ߚଵܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ௜ ൅ ߚଶܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚସ ܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ௜ ൈ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧
൅ ߚହ	ܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ௜ ൈ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ௜ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ
൅ ߚ଻ ܴܧܨܱܴܯ௧ ൈ ܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߜ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߩ௜ ൅ ߳௜,௧,  
(3) 
where ܻ is firm’s ݅ dividend payout (Dividends), investment (Investment), or financial slack (Slack) in 
year ݐ . All the variables are described in detail in Table 1. Since R&D expenses, the number of 
employees, and labor expenses are not mandatory reporting items, data coverage is limited. We therefore 
only report the results using these variables in the Online Appendix, Table A.19. We note here that the 
results are similar to those for capital investment and dividends. 
The variables ܴܧܨܱܴܯ  and ܣܶ  are the same as in specification (2). However, since our 
analysis is no longer performed at the executive level but, instead, at the firm level, we also set the 
treatment indicator ܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ  at the firm level in the specification above. Accordingly, 
ܴܶܧܣܶܨܫܴܯ takes the value of one if the firm employs an executive falling within the scope of the tax 
deductibility limit in year 2013, and zero otherwise. The coefficient β5 captures relative changes in 
dividends, investment, or financial slack between affected and unaffected firms in Austria (first 
difference) to relative changes in these variables between pseudo-affected and pseudo-unaffected firms 
in non-reform countries (second difference) around 2014 (third difference). If firms transfer part of the 
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corporate tax burden onto shareholders, the coefficient β5 should be negative. We additionally control 
for variables that likely affect firms’ dividend payout, investment, and financial slack. Hence, ܺ is a 
vector of control variables that includes Size, Leverage, and TobinsQ to control for the effects on 
Dividends, Investment, and Slack. We further control for ROA and Cash when using Dividends as the 
dependent variable and Sales Growth when using Investment as the dependent variable. Additionally, 
we include industry fixed effects ߩ௜	and year fixed effects ߤ௧ , respectively, to control for time- and 
industry-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Equation (3) effectively compares the relative changes in dividend payout, investment, and 
financial slack of affected Austrian firms relative to unaffected Austrian firms, using the financial 
performance of German and U.S. firms as a benchmark (triple-difference estimation). We limit our 
empirical benchmark to German and U.S. firms because no corporate tax rate changes were implemented 
in these countries. From 2015 to 2018, the U.K. gradually reduced the corporate tax rate from 21% to 
19%,22 and France had to rescind an illegal dividend overtaxing policy, which was disadvantageous for 
firms.23 Although this should not affect our executive-level test in Section 4, it can have effects at the 
firm level when payout, investment, and cash holdings are the dependent variables. 
We report the results in Table 9. Overall, the results suggest that affected Austrian firms 
experience a reduction in their financial slack, measured as cash holdings, relative to unaffected Austrian 
firms. Investments and dividend payout appear to remain unaffected by the change in the tax 
deductibility of executive compensation. For financial slack, we find negative coefficients of interest 
when using either German or U.S. firms as the benchmark. The coefficients of interest are statistically 
significant at the 5% level for the full sample and statistically significant at the 10% level for the matched 
sample. In contrast, for investments and dividend payout, our coefficients of interest remain 
economically and statistically insignificant in the matched sample. 
We interpret these results as being consistent with theory. Although a reduction in dividend 
payout or investment is interpreted as a particularly negative signal to investors (e.g., for dividends, see 
                                                     
22  U.K. Government (2018), Rates and Allowances: Corporation Tax, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax [02/25/2019]. 
23 Local.fr (2017), “‘Amateurism’ sees France forced to pay back EUR 10 billion in tax to big companies,” 
https://www.thelocal.fr/20171018/france-told-to-pay-companies-10-billion-in-blow-to-deficit-target [last 
accessed 02/25/2019]. 
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Woolridge 1982 and Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1994; for investments, see Williams 1988), absorbing the 
economic burden of the increase in tax costs on executive compensation through reduced cash holdings 
is less transparent to investors and highly discretional (George 2005). Nonetheless, a reduction in cash 
holdings reduces firms’ resistance to negative economic shocks (e.g., Latham and Braun 2008). Hence, 
it appears as if shareholders bear part of the corporate tax on executive compensation. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of limiting the tax deductibility of manager compensation on the 
pay of executives. Theory provides ambiguous predictions of whether firms can pass on the additional 
tax burden created by the limited deductibility to executives. We use the 2014 tax law change in Austria 
to examine this question. Using the data on individual executives’ compensation of all disclosing 
Austrian firms, we find evidence that executives affected by the regulation received lower total 
compensation relative to executives unaffected by the limited tax deductibility. However, once we 
compare the response in Austria to a set of four other countries to capture the global trend in executive 
compensation, we find that limiting the tax deductibility of manager compensation has no discernible 
effect on executive compensation. This finding is robust to a battery of robustness tests and subsample 
analyses. Based on our findings, we cautiously conclude that executive compensation is not sensitive to 
the corporate tax code or the tax deductibility of labor expenses, possibly because it was optimally 
negotiated in the first place.  
Our results thus have policy implications because of the heated debate about the level of 
(excessive) executive compensation and increasing inequality (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003). Several 
parties around the world suggest that limiting the deductibility of manager compensation from the 
corporate tax base can fix the problem of excessive pay and reduce income inequality. Our results imply 
that executives do not bear the burden of the corporate income tax. Instead, part of the tax burden is 
borne by shareholders in the form of reduced financial slack, that is, cash holdings, in firms. Decreasing 
cash holdings makes firms more vulnerable to economic shocks and hostile takeovers, and less able to 
finance future investments. Hence, the corporate tax code is not an effective tool if policy makers intend 
to limit executive compensation. 
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Figure 1 Timeline of events in Austria 
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Figure 2 
Total compensation over time by country 
Panel A: Austria  
Panel B: Germany  
Panel C: U.S.  
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Panel D: U.K.  
Panel E: France  
 
Figure 3 
Parallel trends  
This figure plots yearly difference-in-difference coefficients for the pre-reform period (2012 and 2013, Panel A) and 
yearly triple-difference coefficients for the pre-reform period (Panel B) for each non-reform country. Vertical lines 
indicate the confidence interval at the 1% level.  
Panel A: DiD Panel B: Triple Difference 
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Figure 4 
New contracts 
This figure presents the level of executive compensation (total pay and fixed pay) in the pre- and post-reform periods 
for the non-reform country of Germany (DE) and the reform country, Austria (AT), for new contracts. New contracts 
are defined as contracts that were concluded in 2012 or 2013 (PRE) or in 2014 or 2015 (POST) for the first time. ***, 
**, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed t-test), respectively. 
  
Diff: -1.219*** 
t-statistic: 5.55 
Diff: -1.557*** 
t-statistic: 11.84 
Diff-in-Diff: -0.338 
t-statistic: 1.32 
n = 258 
Diff: -0.521** 
t-statistic: 2.51 
Diff: -0.782*** 
t-statistic: 6.29 
Diff-in-Diff: -0.261 
t-statistic: 1.08 
n = 258 
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TABLE 1 
Variable descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables 
Fix Pay Executives’ fixed pay, in thousands. 
ln(Fix Pay) Natural logarithm of executives’ fixed pay. 
Variable Pay  Executives’ variable pay, in thousands. 
ln(Variable Pay) Natural logarithm of executives’ variable pay. 
Total Pay Executives’ total pay, in thousands. 
ln(Total Pay) Natural logarithm of executives’ total pay. 
Dividends Cash dividends paid, defined as cash dividends (Worldscope item 4551) scaled by 
lagged total assets (Worldscope item 2999). 
Investment Defined as capital expenditures (Worldscope item 4601) scaled by lagged total 
assets (Worldscope item 2999). 
Slack Defined as the firm’s cash holdings (Worldscope item 2005) scaled by lagged 
total assets (Worldscope item 2999). 
Firm-Level Variables 
Leverage Defined as total debt (Worldscope item 3255) scaled by the firm’s total assets 
(Worldscope item 2999).  
MTBV Market-to-book value of the firm (Worldscope item MTBV).  
Return Average yearly stock return, defined as the stock price at the end of financial year 
t less that at the end of financial year t - 1, divided by the stock price at the end of 
financial year t - 1 (Worldscope items 5015 to 5070). 
ROA ROA, defined as pre-tax income (Worldscope item 1401) divided by total assets 
(Worldscope item 2999). 
Sales Growth Defined as the natural logarithm of change in sales (Worldscope item 1001) over 
two years.  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (Worldscope item 2999). 
TobinsQ Defined as the sum of equity market value (Worldscope 5301 to 5085) and book 
the value of liabilities, scaled by the sum of the book value of equity and the book 
value of liabilities (Worldscope item 3351). 
CEO Characteristics  
CEO Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the executive is the CEO in the 
current year. 
Age Executive’s age (available only for the hand-collected datasets for Germany and 
Austria). 
YearsFirm Executive’s number of years active in the firm (available only for the hand-
collected datasets for Germany and Austria). 
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TABLE 2 
Sample selection 
 
Step Description Remaining Observations  
  AT DE U.S. U.K. FR 
1 All available executive–years in the hand-
collected (AT/DE), ExecuComp (U.S.), and 
BoardEx (U.K./FR) data.25 
1,005 1,260 83,739 15,434 8,091 
2 Less executive–years missing financials to 
calculate performance control variables in 
Worldscope (total assets, stock return at the 
end of the financial year, pre-tax income, 
market-to-book value). 
913 1,162 46,120 8,655 6,809 
3 Less executives missing pay data 
(total, fixed, and variable compensation). 
885 1,162 46,111 8,645 233 
4 Less executives missing pre-reform 
financial year (2013) and post-reform 
financial year (2014) data. 
621 840 30,556 5,951 127 
 
 
                                                     
25 Non-executive directors are already excluded from BoardEx data. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for Austria (Panel A), Germany (Panel B), the U.S. (Panel C), the U.K. (Panel D), and France (Panel E). We report 
descriptive statistics for the full sample, the control group sample, and the treatment group sample for each country. The control (treatment) group in Austria 
consists of executives earning less (more) than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013. The control (treatment) group in Germany consists of executives earning less 
(more) than EUR 1.7 million in 2012 and 2013. The control (treatment) group in the U.S. consists of executives earning less (more) than EUR 433.000 in 2012 
and 2013. The control (treatment) group in the U.K. consists of executives earning less (more) than EUR 297.000 in 2012 and 2013. The control (treatment) group 
in France consists of executives earning less (more) than EUR 1.8 million in 2012 and 2013.  
Panel A: Austria 
 Full Sample Control Group Treatment Group 
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Fix Pay 612 388.23 194.94 359.39 336 289.46 136.45 285.32 276 508.48 187.92 485.79 
ln(Fix Pay) 612 5.76 0.85 5.88 336 5.44 0.95 5.65 276 6.15 0.49 6.19 
Variable Pay 612 338.96 370.30 250.93 336 205.62 261.39 133.00 276 501.29 416.24 401.02 
ln(Variable Pay) 513 5.53 1.15 5.74 267 5.00 1.23 5.21 246 6.11 0.68 6.06 
Total Pay 612 799.77 547.35 674.87 336 541.82 380.16 466.27 276 1113.80 556.17 965.00 
ln(Total Pay) 612 6.40 0.97 6.51 336 5.97 1.06 6.14 276 6.91 0.45 6.87 
Size 612 14.72 1.99 14.50 336 14.02 1.92 13.99 276 15.56 1.74 14.78 
Return 612 0.08 0.36 0.04 336 0.11 0.41 0.04 276 0.03 0.28 0.02 
ROA 612 0.05 0.04 0.05 336 0.05 0.04 0.04 276 0.05 0.05 0.05 
MTBV 612 1.56 1.08 1.16 336 1.59 1.11 1.26 276 1.52 1.04 1.15 
CEO 612 0.29 0.45 0.00 336 0.19 0.39 0.00 276 0.41 0.49 0.00 
Age 612 52.71 6.91 52.54 336 50.81 6.77 50.04 276 55.03 6.35 55.04 
YearsFirm 612 14.44 10.35 11.59 336 13.18 9.88 10.00 276 15.87 10.69 14.30 
Panel B: Germany 
 Full Sample Control Group Treatment Group 
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Fix Pay 840 708.38 336.26 648.77 456 600.66 274.40 569.10 384 836.30 357.80 751.17 
ln(Fix Pay) 840 6.46 0.48 6.48 456 6.31 0.45 6.34 384 6.64 0.45 6.62 
Variable Pay 840 1,636.56 993.07 1,479.63 456 1192.09 676.15 1150.68 384 2164.36 1050.10 1946.55 
ln(Variable Pay) 819 7.24 0.68 7.31 444 6.95 0.65 7.07 375 7.59 0.54 7.59 
Total Pay 840 2,450.50 1,223.65 2,224.96 456 1880.55 810.03 1811.71 384 3127.32 1286.26 2841.46 
ln(Total Pay) 840 7.67 0.55 7.71 456 7.44 0.49 7.50 384 7.95 0.47 7.95 
Size 840 17.64 1.91 17.65 456 17.62 1.62 17.40 384 17.65 2.22 18.41 
Return 840 0.12 0.28 0.10 456 0.12 0.30 0.10 384 0.12 0.26 0.12 
ROA 840 0.05 0.04 0.06 456 0.05 0.04 0.06 384 0.05 0.05 0.06 
MTBV 840 2.29 2.00 1.78 456 2.33 2.06 1.94 384 2.24 1.93 1.54 
CEO 840 0.19 0.40 0.00 456 0.04 0.21 0.00 384 0.37 0.48 0.00 
Age 840 53.91 5.51 54.04 456 52.69 5.93 53.04 384 55.36 4.56 56.04 
YearsFirm 840 16.18 9.91 15.01 456 15.16 9.72 14.01 384 17.38 10.01 17.01 
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Panel C: U.S. 
 Full Sample Control Group Treatment Group 
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Fix Pay 30,556 548.70 295.41 475.00 15,809 379.76 172.94 355.21 14,747 729.81 292.16 663.56 
ln(Fix Pay) 30,556 6.16 0.56 6.16 15,809 5.84 0.48 5.87 14,747 6.51 0.43 6.50 
Variable Pay 30,556 77.40 292.35 0.00 15,809 33.65 168.02 0.00 14,747 124.29 377.61 0.00 
ln(Variable Pay) 5,918 4.99 1.71 5.16 2,731 4.26 1.61 4.43 3,187 5.61 1.54 5.78 
Total Pay 30,556 628.00 442.58 507.50 15,809 413.69 255.93 371.30 14,747 857.74 483.35 725.00 
ln(Total Pay) 30,556 6.26 0.60 6.23 15,809 5.90 0.49 5.92 14,747 6.64 0.46 6.59 
Size 30,556 14.83 1.71 14.81 15,809 14.21 1.57 14.18 14,747 15.48 1.60 15.49 
Return 30,556 0.18 0.41 0.15 15,809 0.19 0.44 0.15 14,747 0.18 0.39 0.15 
ROA 30,556 0.06 0.14 0.06 15,809 0.05 0.14 0.05 14,747 0.07 0.14 0.06 
MTBV 30,556 3.83 8.84 2.70 15,809 3.76 8.06 2.64 14,747 3.91 9.61 2.77 
CEO 30,556 0.23 0.42 0.00 15,809 0.08 0.27 0.00 14,747 0.39 0.49 0.00 
Age 30,528 54.30 7.12 54.00 15,784 52.81 7.00 53.00 14,744 55.90 6.90 56.00 
Panel D: U.K. 
 Full Sample Control Group Treatment Group
 N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Fix Pay 5,951 378.91 285.27 309.00 3,133 220.80 180.31 189.00 2,818 554.70 277.52 488.00 
ln(Fix Pay) 5,769 5.70 0.80 5.76 2,958 5.22 0.75 5.28 2,811 6.21 0.47 6.19 
Variable Pay 5,951 210.09 374.90 37.00 3,133 72.06 180.30 0.00 2,818 363.54 464.73 222.00 
ln(Variable Pay) 3,467 5.14 1.41 5.38 1,405 4.24 1.38 4.22 2,062 5.76 1.04 5.83 
Total Pay 5,951 593.27 608.13 390.00 3,133 294.80 338.41 213.00 2,818 925.12 666.76 723.00 
ln(Total Pay) 5,776 5.99 0.98 6.01 2,965 5.39 0.86 5.41 2,811 6.63 0.62 6.58 
Size 5,951 11.61 2.42 11.42 3,133 10.44 2.01 10.31 2,818 12.92 2.14 12.66 
Return 5,951 0.17 0.50 0.09 3,133 0.16 0.58 0.05 2,818 0.17 0.41 0.13 
ROA 5,951 -0.01 0.34 0.05 3,133 -0.07 0.43 0.03 2,818 0.05 0.16 0.07 
MTBV 5,951 2.67 3.64 1.78 3,133 2.39 3.76 1.53 2,818 2.98 3.47 2.15 
CEO 5,951 0.39 0.49 0.00 3,133 0.31 0.46 0.00 2,818 0.48 0.50 0.00 
Age 5,951 52.94 8.33 53.04 3,133 52.46 9.41 52.04 2,818 53.47 6.90 53.04 
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Panel E: France 
 Full Sample Control Group Treatment Group 
N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Fix Pay 127 1,247.68 729.94 1,094.00 72 1122.64 834.97 949.50 55 1411.36 527.67 1288.00 
ln(Fix Pay) 127 6.98 0.56 7.00 72 6.82 0.63 6.86 55 7.19 0.34 7.16 
Variable Pay 127 1,208.30 746.41 1,141.00 72 1049.58 808.75 841.50 55 1416.07 602.03 1277.00 
ln(Variable Pay) 127 6.83 0.86 7.04 72 6.58 1.01 6.73 55 7.16 0.45 7.15 
Total Pay 127 2,457.06 1,377.07 2,202.00 72 2169.92 1581.91 1750.50 55 2832.96 938.44 2624.00 
ln(Total Pay) 127 7.64 0.63 7.70 72 7.44 0.73 7.47 55 7.90 0.30 7.87 
Size 127 16.75 0.78 16.93 72 16.53 0.78 16.72 55 17.05 0.68 17.06 
Return 127 0.06 0.26 0.07 72 0.03 0.26 0.04 55 0.11 0.25 0.09 
ROA 127 0.07 0.08 0.06 72 0.08 0.10 0.06 55 0.06 0.03 0.05 
MTBV 127 2.59 2.21 2.04 72 2.97 2.72 2.16 55 2.10 1.09 1.91 
CEO 127 0.46 0.50 0.00 72 0.32 0.47 0.00 55 0.65 0.48 1.00 
Age 127 58.42 5.25 59.04 72 57.30 5.97 58.04 55 59.88 3.69 60.04 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Results of entropy balancing 
 
This table presents the results of the entropy matching procedure. Matching was performed based on the pre-reform (before 2013) covariates Size, ROA, Return, and 
MTBV. The table reports the means for Size, ROA, Return, and MTBV for the reform country, Austria (AT), and all the means of all the covariates for the non-reform 
countries of Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR) before and after matching. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean  Mean after Entropy Balancing  Mean before Entropy Balancing 
 AT  DE U.S. U.K. FR  DE U.S. U.K. FR 
Size 14.62  14.63 14.62 14.62 16.04***  17.57*** 14.63 11.47*** 16.71*** 
ROA 0.054  0.054 0.054 0.054 0.066  0.050* 0.065*** -0.007*** 0.074*** 
Return 0.045  0.045 0.045 0.045 0.062  0.070** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.022 
MTBV 1.434  1.439 1.435 1.434 1.923*  2.092*** 3.723*** 2.515*** 2.221*** 
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TABLE 5 
Within-country compensation changes 
 
This table presents the within-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (the reform country) and Germany, the U.S., the U.K., and France (all non-reform countries). 
The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (sum of fixed pay and variable pay) 
and fixed and variable compensation; Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward; 
Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 
2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, 
U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French 
executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13. All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 
1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant 
differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Austria and Germany 
 Austria (Reform Country)  Germany (Non-Reform Country) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Total Pay Fixed Pay Var. Pay  Total Pay Fixed Pay Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.245*** -0.045 -0.236**  -0.263*** -0.143** -0.350*** 
 (0.071) (0.096) (0.110)  (0.065) (0.060) (0.080) 
Size -0.253 0.166 -0.797***  0.183* -0.065 0.202 
 (0.161) (0.181) (0.264)  (0.107) (0.109) (0.127) 
ROA 1.122 3.307* 3.383***  -0.376 0.161 -0.503 
 (0.745) (1.811) (1.229)  (0.835) (0.682) (0.956) 
Return -0.127* -0.161*** 0.274***  0.153** 0.016 0.269*** 
 (0.065) (0.057) (0.099)  (0.066) (0.058) (0.076) 
MTBV 0.010 -0.014 -0.139*  -0.014 -0.004 -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.079)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
CEO 0.195** 0.515 0.114  0.378*** 0.339*** 0.328** 
 (0.097) (0.376) (0.115)  (0.098) (0.082) (0.131) 
Observations 612 612 513  840 840 819 
Executive fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.885 0.775 0.762  0.547 0.568 0.548 
Panel B: U.S. and U.K. 
 U. S. (Non-Reform Country)  U.K. (Non-Reform Country) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Total Pay Fixed Pay Var. Pay  Total Pay Fixed Pay Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.118*** -0.107*** -0.091  -0.150*** -0.067*** -0.279*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.057)  (0.021) (0.017) (0.051) 
Size 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.220***  0.146*** 0.067*** 0.277*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.058)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.051) 
ROA 0.039* 0.005 0.055  -0.105** -0.058 0.143 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.114)  (0.050) (0.046) (0.236) 
Return 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.108***  0.039*** 0.008 0.108*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.033)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.025) 
MTBV 0.000 0.000 -0.002  0.008*** 0.004** 0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
CEO 0.472*** 0.523*** 0.271**  0.247*** 0.246*** 0.326*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.127)  (0.055) (0.051) (0.086) 
Observations 30,556 30,556 4,885  5,772 5,765 3,345 
Executive fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.818 0.831 0.822  0.879 0.874 0.832 
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Panel C: France 
 France (Non-Reform Country) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total Pay Fixed Pay Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.163 -0.194 -0.199 
 (0.108) (0.122) (0.195) 
Size -0.176 -0.147 -0.521 
 (0.367) (0.372) (0.526) 
ROA 0.773 1.155 1.090 
 (0.717) (1.026) (1.412) 
Return 0.192 -0.021 0.442** 
 (0.124) (0.106) (0.189) 
MTBV -0.068 -0.037 -0.135* 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.066) 
CEO 0.200 0.113 0.312 
 (0.132) (0.102) (0.208) 
Observations 127 127 127 
Executive fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.885 0.828 0.864 
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TABLE 6 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ total compensation levels 
 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (sum of fixed 
pay and variable pay). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and 
Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 
in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 
million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and 
French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent 
variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.266***  -0.118***  -0.194***  -0.174* 
 (0.064)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.103) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.029  -0.110  -0.030  -0.072 
 (0.096)  (0.070)  (0.075)  (0.129) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.870  0.821  0.880  0.907 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.266***  -0.131***  -0.196***  -0.175* 
 (0.065)  (0.009)  (0.024)  (0.103) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.027  -0.108  -0.037  -0.072 
 (0.095)  (0.069)  (0.073)  (0.130) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.881  0.862  0.880  0.924 
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TABLE 7 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ fixed compensation levels 
 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of fixed compensation. The variable 
Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and Treatment is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment 
takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more 
than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than 
EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We 
report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant 
differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.147**  -0.107***  -0.115***  -0.223* 
 (0.061)  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.114) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.085  0.024  0.033  0.162 
 (0.106)  (0.085)  (0.088)  (0.165) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.772  0.829  0.862  0.831 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.147**  -0.106***  -0.120***  -0.204* 
 (0.061)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.111) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.089  0.024  0.038  0.121 
 (0.107)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.153) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.781  0.798  0.810  0.876 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403486
 45 
 
TABLE 8 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ variable compensation levels 
 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of variable compensation. The variable 
Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and Treatment is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment 
takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more 
than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than 
EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13. All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust 
standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.330***  -0.096*  -0.277***  -0.239 
 (0.079)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.178) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.089  -0.128  0.051  0.001 
 (0.135)  (0.123)  (0.124)  (0.211) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.826  0.820  0.823  0.814 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.326***  -0.139**  -0.272***  -0.221 
 (0.080)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.179) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.087  -0.094  0.042  -0.018 
 (0.134)  (0.120)  (0.122)  (0.211) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.833  0.763  0.786  0.859 
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TABLE 9 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level  
on firm investment, payout, and financial slack 
 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for firm investment, payout, and financial slack from 2012 to 
2017 separately for Germany (DE) and the U.S. The dependent variable for payout is defined as cash dividends scaled 
by total assets, the dependent variable for investment is defined as change in capital expenditure over lagged total 
assets, and the dependent variable for financial slack is defined as cash holdings scaled by total assets. The variable 
Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable TreatFirm is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if any Austrian board member earned more than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013, a German 
executive earned more than EUR 3.35 million, or a U.S. executive earned more than EUR 500,000. All the remaining 
independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Germany 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Dividends Investment Cash  Dividends Investment Cash 
Reform × TreatFirm 0.004 0.008 0.020  0.003 0.001 0.028 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)  (0.012) (0.017) (0.031) 
Reform × TreatFirm × AT 0.003 0.015 -0.077**  0.003 0.027 -0.071* 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.037)  (0.014) (0.023) (0.041) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 307 374  358 306 372 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.278 0.342 0.249  0.258 0.315 0.470 
Panel B: U.S. 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Dividends Investment Cash  Dividends Investment Cash 
Reform × TreatFirm 0.001 0.009* 0.008  0.000 0.010* 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) 
Reform × TreatFirm × AT 0.003 0.004 -0.060**  0.004 0.006 -0.056* 
 (0.007) (0.013) 0.030  (0.007) (0.012) (0.029) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,669 9,170 9,987  9,586 9,135 9,837 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.121 0.196 0.374  0.141 0.222 0.371 
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A.1 LEN model with executive bargaining power 
A simple moral hazard LEN model with regard to executive bargaining power—following Fuest, 
Peichl, and Siegloch’s (2015) individual wage bargaining model—is ambiguous: the firm owner outcome 
 depends on executive effort  and an exogenous factor  that prevents effort from being 
directly verifiable. Therefore, the contract between a firm and a manager must provide incentives that 
motivate the manager to work in the interests of the firm. An alignment of interests is usually achieved via 
bonus payments that are linked to the firm’s outcome with a bonus factor . Therefore, the executive’s 
compensation  comprises a fixed amount  and a performance-based remuneration component 
, dependent on the manager’s bargaining power, which grows in . Normally, 
the manager is assumed to be risk averse, since the manager really depends on this compensation, expressed 
by his or her certainty equivalent . This certainty 
equivalent needs to be at least as high as the compensation of an alternative job ; therefore, the manager 
accepts the contract in the first place or does not resign later on. The principal wants to maximize after-tax 
income, ensuring the manager’s participation via the fulfillment of the participation constraint (PC) and the 
manager’s effort via the fulfillment of the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). The deductibility limit of 
compensation is presented as . The term  is defined for all limits lower 
than the overall compensation, and it equals one if there is no restriction, 
 
  
(A.1) 
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Since    2 21 1c c   , the absolute value of the of Co2 is always greater than of Co1. However, if a 
deductibility limit affects remuneration negatively depends on whether 2 1r  . Hence, predictions 
concerning the effect of a deductibility limit are ambiguous.  
Several researchers have already investigated the effects of basing the performance-related remuneration 
components on either pre- or after tax performance measures. For example, Phillips (2003) and Gaertner 
(2014) find that using after-tax incentives is positively associated with lower effective tax rates. Powers, 
Robinson and Stomberg (2016) show that firms report lower ETRs in case the CEO’s performance is 
measured after-tax – dependent the general design of the incentive system. In this model basing the agent’s 
remuneration on after-tax profits before remuneration costs instead of pre-tax profits before remuneration 
costs sheds qualitatively similar, ambiguous results.    
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Figure A.1 
Fixed compensation over time by country 
Panel A: Austria  
Panel B: Germany  
Panel C: U.S.  
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Panel D: U.K.  
Panel E: France  
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Figure A.2 
Variable compensation over time by country 
Panel A: Austria  
Panel B: Germany  
Panel C: U.S.  
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Panel D: U.K.  
Panel E: France  
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TABLE A.1  
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ total compensation levels, pseudo-reform distribution 
 
This table presents the results for total pay if the pseudo-reform distribution is implemented in all control 
countries and replaces the rigor EUR 500,000 limit in the U.S. and the U.K. (Table 6). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (sum of fixed 
pay and variable pay). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and 
Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than 
EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more 
than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 433,000, U.K. executives earning more than 
EUR 297,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2013 (pseudo-reform). All the 
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the 
executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.266***  -0.113***  -0.206***  -0.174* 
 (0.064)  (0.008)  (0.025)  (0.103) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.029  -0.115  -0.019  -0.072 (0.096)  (0.070)  (0.076)  (0.129) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.870  0.821  0.881  0.907 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.266***  -0.126***  -0.209***  -0.175* 
 (0.065)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.103) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.027  -0.113  -0.024  -0.072 (0.095)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.130) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.881  0.862  0.880  0.924 
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TABLE A.2  
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ fixed compensation levels, pseudo-reform distribution 
 
This table presents the results for fixed pay if the pseudo-reform distribution is implemented in all the 
control countries and replaces the EUR 500,000 limit in the U.S. and the U.K. (Table 7). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of fixed compensation. The variable 
Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and Treatment is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable 
Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives 
earning more than EUR 433,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 297,000, and French executives 
earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2013 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined 
in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.147**  -0.112***  -0.164***  -0.223* 
 (0.061)  (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.114) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.085  0.028  0.081  0.162 (0.106)  (0.085)  (0.089)  (0.165) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.772  0.830  0.863  0.831 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.147**  -0.111***  -0.168***  -0.204* 
 (0.061)  (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.111) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.089  0.029  0.085  0.121 (0.107)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.153) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.781  0.798  0.810  0.876 
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TABLE A.3  
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ variable compensation levels, pseudo-reform distribution 
 
This table presents the results for variable pay if the pseudo-reform distribution is implemented in all the 
control countries and replaces the EUR 500,000 limit in the U.S. and the U.K. (Table 8). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of variable compensation. The 
variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and Treatment is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2013. The variable 
Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives 
earning more than EUR 433,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 297,000, and French executives 
earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are 
defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  
Variable 
Pay  
Variable 
Pay  
Variable 
Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.330***  -0.044  -0.346***  -0.239 
 (0.079)  (0.057)  (0.066)  (0.178) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.089  -0.180  0.119  0.001 (0.135)  (0.123)  (0.128)  (0.211) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.826  0.820  0.824  0.814 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  
Variable 
Pay  
Variable 
Pay  
Variable 
Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.326***  -0.089  -0.328***  -0.221 
 (0.080)  (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.179) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.087  -0.145  0.097  -0.018 (0.134)  (0.121)  (0.126)  (0.211) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.833  0.763  0.787  0.859 
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TABLE A.4 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ total compensation levels 
 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (sum of fixed 
pay and variable pay). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward, and 
Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 
in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 
million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and 
French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent 
variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.261***  -0.132***  -0.189***  -0.238** 
 (0.053)  (0.008)  (0.026)  (0.114) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.098  -0.037  0.045  0.108 
 (0.110)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.133) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects No  No  No  No 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.630  0.500  0.597  0.537 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.261***  -0.126***  -0.193***  -0.291** 
 (0.054)  (0.010)  (0.026)  (0.112) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.102  -0.034  0.049  0.170 
 (0.110)  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.138) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects No  No  No  No 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.621  0.437  0.531  0.620 
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TABLE A.5 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, lagged reform 
This table presents the results for a lagged reform in 2015, when ultimate legal certainty was established, 
instead of 2014 (unmatched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed 
compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking 
the value of one for 2015 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian 
executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13.The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German 
executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives 
earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13. All the 
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive 
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.193***  -0.091***  -0.150***  -0.095 
 (0.058)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.107) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.013  -0.101  -0.050  -0.122 
 (0.094)  (0.073)  (0.076)  (0.136) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.868  0.820  0.880  0.905 
Panel B: Fixed Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.103**  -0.084***  -0.103***  -0.204* 
 (0.048)  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.114) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.054  0.022  0.030  0.158 
 (0.118)  (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.181) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.770  0.828  0.862  0.831 
Panel C: Variable Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.187***  -0.066  -0.294***  -0.118 
 (0.069)  (0.066)  (0.053)  (0.164) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.016  -0.094  0.114  -0.069 
 (0.141)  (0.139)  (0.135)  (0.214) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.824  0.820  0.825  0.813 
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TABLE A.6 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, lagged reform 
This table presents results for a lagged reform in 2015 instead of 2014, when ultimate legal certainty 
occurred (matched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), 
fixed compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for 2015 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one 
for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13.The variable Treatment takes the value of 
one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 433,000, 
U.K. executives earning more than EUR 297,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 
2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust 
standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.192***  -0.103***  -0.152***  -0.081 
 (0.059)  (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.111) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.027  -0.103  -0.055  -0.148 
 (0.095)  (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.141) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,384  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.877  0.861  0.883  0.919 
Panel B: Fixed Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.103**  -0.084***  -0.108***  -0.165 
 (0.049)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.109) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.045  0.009  0.029  0.084 
 (0.120)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.169) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,452  31,168  6,377  739 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.776  0.794  0.808  0.873 
Panel C: Variable Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay
Reform × Treatment -0.183***  -0.110  -0.266***  -0.087 
 (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.055)  (0.165) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.014  -0.063  0.094  -0.097 
 (0.141)  (0.138)  (0.134)  (0.213) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,330  5,396  3,856  638 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.831  0.763  0.788  0.858 
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TABLE A.7 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, balanced panel 
This table presents the results for executives who were board members during the whole sample period from 
2012 to 2017, to track compensation changes continuously (unmatched sample). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. We require at least six consecutive executive–years to be included in the panel. The dependent 
variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), and 
variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. 
The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than 
EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than 
EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, 
and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent 
variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay  
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.100**  -0.093***  -0.105***  -0.287*** 
 (0.044)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.094) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.119  -0.111  -0.089  0.057 
 (0.080)  (0.072)  (0.077)  (0.114) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 885  16,683  3,665  471 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.915  0.875  0.912  0.886 
Panel B: Fixed Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.027  -0.068***  -0.019  -0.262** 
 (0.037)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.130) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.056  -0.011  -0.055  0.164 
 (0.066)  (0.054)  (0.056)  (0.148) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 885  16,683  3,658  471 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.880  0.904  0.917  0.880 
Panel C: Variable Pay  
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.029  -0.207**  -0.227***  -0.380** 
 (0.079)  (0.084)  (0.064)  (0.166) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.176  0.023  0.028  0.112 
 (0.176)  (0.180)  (0.173)  (0.240) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 829  3,144  2,337  415 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.872  0.823  0.852  0.848 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403486
 13 
 
TABLE A.8 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, balanced panel 
This table presents the results for executives who were board members during the whole sample period from 
2012 to 2017, to track compensation changes continuously (matched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. We require at least six consecutive executive–years to be included in the panel. The dependent 
variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), and 
variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 
onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning 
more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning 
more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than 
EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the 
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive 
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.099**  -0.099***  -0.102***  -0.286*** 
 (0.044)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.095) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.119  -0.113  -0.099  0.058 
 (0.080)  (0.070)  (0.075)  (0.116) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 885  16,683  3,665  471 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.915  0.858  0.899  0.926 
Panel B: Fixed Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.031  -0.071***  -0.019  -0.350* 
 (0.040)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.195) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.005  -0.012  -0.059  0.303 
 (0.060)  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.196) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 885  16,683  3,658  471 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.879  0.881  0.897  0.888 
Panel C: Variable Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.054  -0.149*  -0.250***  -0.352 
 (0.098)  (0.085)  (0.094)  (0.228) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.285*  -0.179  -0.068  0.002 
 (0.164)  (0.153)  (0.161)  (0.260) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 829  3,144  2,337  415 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.875  0.812  0.835  0.877 
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TABLE A.9 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
(non-)CEOs’ compensation levels 
 
This table shows the results for the total pay of executives who serve as CEOs and those with other roles, 
separately, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (unmatched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for CEO compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 separately 
for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform 
countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed 
compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking 
the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 
Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for 
German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. 
executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13. 
All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the 
executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: CEOs 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.210**  -0.050**  -0.144***  -0.130 
 (0.082)  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.155) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.154  -0.033  0.062  0.076 
 (0.120)  (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.173) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 336  7,040  2,399  233 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.898  0.864  0.883  0.878 
Panel B: Non-CEOs 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.309***  -0.103***  -0.153***  -0.161 
 (0.081)  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.126) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.037  -0.117  -0.065  -0.136 
 (0.118)  (0.086)  (0.091)  (0.163) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,102  23,684  3,927  500 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.861  0.783  0.881  0.907 
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TABLE A.10 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
(non-)CEOs’ compensation levels 
 
This table shows the results for the total pay of executives who serve as CEOs and those with other roles, 
separately, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (matched sample). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for CEO compensation levels from 2012 to 2017 
separately for Austria (AT), the reform country, and Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), 
fixed compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value of one 
for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of 
one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, 
U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 
2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust 
standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: CEOs (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.206**  -0.060***  -0.142***  -0.107 
 (0.083)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.143) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.148  -0.028  0.056  0.052 
 (0.121)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.166) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 336  7,040  2,399  233 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.896  0.839  0.875  0.899 
Panel B: Non-CEOs (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.307***  -0.115***  -0.159***  -0.168 
 (0.081)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.118) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.040  -0.125  -0.070  -0.119 
 (0.118)  (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.163) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,102  23,684  3,927  500 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.876  0.863  0.885  0.920 
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TABLE A.11 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median of FirmExperience 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on executives’ individual firm experience, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (unmatched 
sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), 
the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation 
(Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives 
earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more 
than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13. All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total Compensation 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.269**  -0.002  
-
0.233***  -0.081 
 
-0.282***  -0.099***  -0.084***  -0.315* 
 (0.113)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.117)  (0.072)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.174) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.037  -0.117  0.091  -0.257  0.125  -0.151*  -0.165*  0.172 
 (0.159)  (0.122)  (0.127)  (0.169)  (0.111)  (0.088)  (0.085)  (0.196) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 655  2,540  2,828  330  796  2,735  3,544  408 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.887  0.835  0.831  0.926  0.833  0.852  0.925  0.845 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.179*  0.035  -0.156***  -0.095  -0.128  -0.066***  0.001  -0.341** 
 (0.096)  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.153)  (0.080)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.151) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.115  0.067  0.237  0.018  0.062  -0.089  -0.157  0.269 
 (0.163)  (0.179)  (0.192)  (0.261)  (0.109)  (0.098)  (0.096)  (0.164) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 655  2,540  2,828  330  796  2,735  3,537  408 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.805  0.833  0.797  0.854  0.697  0.864  0.925  0.751 
Panel C: Variable Compensation 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.319**  0.023  -0.264***  -0.087  -0.365***  -0.179  -0.283***  -0.603* 
 (0.136)  (0.232)  (0.075)  (0.209)  (0.096)  (0.208)  (0.072)  (0.311) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.066  -0.152  0.152  -0.343  0.262*  -0.043  0.040  0.539 
 (0.221)  (0.297)  (0.205)  (0.274)  (0.156)  (0.268)  (0.175)  (0.333) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 596  496  1,714  277  733  642  2,135  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.811  0.756  0.806  0.788  0.839  0.843  0.835  0.840 
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TABLE A.12 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median of FirmExperience 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on executive’s individual firm experience, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (matched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), 
the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation 
(Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning 
more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 433,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 297,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 
million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.269**  -0.005  -0.241***  -0.041  -0.283***  -0.107***  -0.076***  -0.350** 
 (0.113)  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.113)  (0.072)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.167) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.039  -0.129  0.100  -0.317*  0.127  -0.145*  -0.173**  0.219 
 (0.158)  (0.123)  (0.127)  (0.168)  (0.110)  (0.086)  (0.083)  (0.189) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 655  2,540  2,828  330  796  2,735  3,544  408 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.899  0.883  0.869  0.938  0.840  0.829  0.900  0.891 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.179*  0.029  -0.150***  -0.043  -0.128  -0.065**  0.002  -0.359** 
 (0.097)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.116)  (0.081)  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.158) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.118  0.079  0.221  -0.068  0.063  -0.094  -0.159  0.282 
 (0.163)  (0.183)  (0.188)  (0.224)  (0.108)  (0.105)  (0.100)  (0.182) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 655  2,540  2,828  330  796  2,735  3,537  408 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.815  0.842  0.796  0.889  0.696  0.797  0.835  0.847 
Panel C: Variable Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 FirmExperience < Median in 2013  FirmExperience > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.313**  -0.016  -0.274***  -0.022  -0.363***  -0.214  -0.229***  -0.579* 
 (0.136)  (0.256)  (0.078)  (0.208)  (0.096)  (0.221)  (0.074)  (0.303) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.078  -0.159  0.144  -0.413  0.269*  -0.006  0.018  0.515 
 (0.221)  (0.313)  (0.204)  (0.266)  (0.155)  (0.275)  (0.171)  (0.325) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 596  496  1,714  277  733  642  2,135  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.816  0.680  0.737  0.857  0.847  0.822  0.821  0.865 
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TABLE A.13 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median of Age 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on executives’ individual age, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (unmatched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the 
U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel 
B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking 
the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than 
EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 
2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Total Compensation 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.276***  -0.104***  -0.173***  -0.188  -0.165*  -0.066***  -0.111***  -0.208 
 (0.089)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.148)  (0.095)  (0.011)  (0.032)  (0.131) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.081  -0.032  0.033  -0.037  -0.089  -0.191  -0.153  -0.030 
 (0.138)  (0.094)  (0.099)  (0.177)  (0.144)  (0.123)  (0.126)  (0.186) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 753  14,583  3,497  378  698  16,584  2,886  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.895  0.808  0.878  0.926  0.817  0.824  0.884  0.845 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.158*  -0.095***  -0.110***  -0.159  -0.016  -0.055***  -0.004  -0.332* 
 (0.081)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.126)  (0.085)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.185) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.095  0.083  0.085  0.088  -0.005  0.015  -0.040  0.313 
 (0.111)  (0.082)  (0.088)  (0.154)  (0.207)  (0.229)  (0.231)  (0.324) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 753  14,583  3,496  378  698  16,584  2,880  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.865  0.818  0.867  0.918  0.612  0.833  0.859  0.657 
Panel C: Variable Compensation 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.269**  -0.111  -0.247***  -0.084  -0.294***  -0.151  -0.290***  -0.365 
 (0.120)  (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.208)  (0.105)  (0.096)  (0.087)  (0.270) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.033  -0.049  0.090  -0.247  0.168  -0.048  0.063  0.279 
 (0.201)  (0.178)  (0.163)  (0.258)  (0.185)  (0.225)  (0.220)  (0.310) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 670  2,492  2,141  310  659  2,903  1,714  327 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.830  0.796  0.825  0.833  0.824  0.837  0.824  0.783 
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TABLE A.14 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median of Age 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on executives’ individual age, to account for potential differences in bargaining power (matched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the 
U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), 
and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 
million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 
(pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Total Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.274***  -0.113***  -0.185***  -0.162  -0.167*  -0.081***  -0.103***  -0.223* 
 (0.090)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.147)  (0.095)  (0.012)  (0.033)  (0.129) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.072  -0.050  0.030  -0.055  -0.058  -0.177  -0.160  0.006 
 (0.139)  (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.185)  (0.142)  (0.121)  (0.127)  (0.176) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 753  14,583  3,497  378  698  16,584  2,886  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.905  0.885  0.893  0.931  0.819  0.802  0.865  0.899 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.159*  -0.095***  -0.117***  -0.127  -0.015  -0.057***  -0.008  -0.325* 
 (0.082)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.126)  (0.085)  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.178) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.097  0.078  0.095  0.054  0.027  0.022  -0.032  0.310 
 (0.111)  (0.084)  (0.087)  (0.158)  (0.203)  (0.233)  (0.233)  (0.291) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 753  14,583  3,496  378  698  16,584  2,880  360 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.877  0.885  0.881  0.927  0.599  0.648  0.715  0.790 
Panel C: Variable Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 Executive Age < Median in 2013  Executive Age > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.260**  -0.219**  -0.246***  -0.069  -0.294***  -0.157  -0.248***  -0.327 
 (0.121)  (0.103)  (0.064)  (0.199)  (0.106)  (0.098)  (0.087)  (0.268) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.044  0.041  0.080  -0.242  0.181  -0.029  0.060  0.211 
 (0.201)  (0.178)  (0.159)  (0.248)  (0.184)  (0.220)  (0.218)  (0.310) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 670  2,492  2,141  310  659  2,903  1,714  327 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.839  0.757  0.789  0.865  0.826  0.755  0.779  0.855 
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TABLE A.15 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median ROA 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on firms’ individual ROA, to account for potential differences in pay ability (unmatched sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the 
U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), 
and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 
million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 
(pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total Compensation 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.292***  -0.076***  -0.145***  -0.190*  -0.248**  -0.106***  -0.154***  -0.107 
 (0.081)  (0.012)  (0.040)  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.135) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.031  -0.142  -0.091  -0.072  0.055  -0.032  0.030  -0.084 
 (0.123)  (0.095)  (0.104)  (0.139)  (0.158)  (0.123)  (0.125)  (0.197) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 679  15,483  3,003  350  772  15,684  3,380  388 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.810  0.824  0.860  0.834  0.894  0.815  0.895  0.930 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.187**  -0.066***  -0.076**  0.022  -0.104  -0.100***  -0.068***  -0.302* 
 (0.075)  (0.009)  (0.034)  (0.056)  (0.094)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.172) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.034  -0.123  -0.136  -0.241**  0.213  0.174  0.151  0.414 
 (0.103)  (0.084)  (0.093)  (0.109)  (0.216)  (0.214)  (0.216)  (0.316) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 679  15,483  2,997  350  772  15,684  3,379  388 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.765  0.834  0.839  0.855  0.779  0.822  0.882  0.831 
Panel C: Variable Compensation 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.349***  -0.078  -0.259***  -0.430*  -0.313**  -0.178  -0.252***  0.042 
 (0.100)  (0.085)  (0.087)  (0.218)  (0.124)  (0.108)  (0.066)  (0.219) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.036  -0.077  0.063  0.224  0.230  0.197  0.281  -0.133 
 (0.231)  (0.152)  (0.156)  (0.299)  (0.167)  (0.213)  (0.197)  (0.255) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 608  2,854  1,475  298  721  2,541  2,380  339 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.821  0.831  0.841  0.822  0.830  0.811  0.815  0.827 
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TABLE A.16 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, split by the median ROA 
 
This table shows the results based on a median split on firms’ individual ROA, to account for potential differences in pay ability (matched sample). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the 
U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-reform countries. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), 
and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 
million, U.S. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 
(pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Total Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.292***  -0.089***  -0.148***  -0.204**  -0.246**  -0.116***  -0.160***  -0.084 
 (0.080)  (0.013)  (0.040)  (0.081)  (0.101)  (0.013)  (0.026)  (0.138) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.050  -0.143  -0.088  -0.046  0.053  -0.027  0.033  -0.138 
 (0.122)  (0.094)  (0.102)  (0.125)  (0.158)  (0.122)  (0.125)  (0.219) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 679  15,483  3,003  350  772  15,684  3,380  388 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.809  0.786  0.850  0.883  0.906  0.893  0.907  0.934 
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Panel B: Fixed Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.185**  -0.075***  -0.078**  0.009  -0.107  -0.087***  -0.076***  -0.274 
 (0.075)  (0.010)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.095)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.165) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.015  -0.127  -0.131  -0.214**  0.227  0.179  0.178  0.294 
 (0.100)  (0.084)  (0.091)  (0.089)  (0.219)  (0.220)  (0.227)  (0.308) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 679  15,483  2,997  350  772  15,684  3,379  388 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.760  0.797  0.821  0.909  0.790  0.804  0.817  0.865 
Panel C: Variable Compensation (Matched Sample) 
 ROA < Median in 2013  ROA > Median in 2013 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR  DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay  Var. Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.350***  -0.099  -0.235***  -0.488***  -0.307**  -0.217*  -0.272***  0.097 
 (0.099)  (0.090)  (0.090)  (0.180)  (0.126)  (0.111)  (0.068)  (0.168) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.052  -0.043  0.066  0.283  0.221  0.169  0.278  -0.196 
 (0.230)  (0.143)  (0.151)  (0.271)  (0.166)  (0.206)  (0.196)  (0.237) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 608  2,854  1,475  298  721  2,541  2,380  339 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.828  0.779  0.801  0.859  0.838  0.765  0.784  0.870 
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TABLE A.17 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, top earners 
This table presents the results for top-earning executives, who are paid above the median, to account for 
potential discriminating relations between the highest incomes and bargaining power (unmatched 
sample).  
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, 
separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. We restrict the sample of treated executives to executives above the median in terms of the 
variable PayDifference. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total compensation (Panel 
A), fixed compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable Reform is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable taking the value 
of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable Treatment takes the 
value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives earning more than 
EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives earning more than 
EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. 
We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant 
differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.244***  -0.145***  -0.176***  -0.221 
 (0.067)  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.139) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.017  -0.057  -0.011  -0.028 
 (0.108)  (0.083)  (0.088)  (0.171) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,133  25,122  5,335  575 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.886  0.835  0.883  0.911 
Panel B: Fixed Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.097  -0.114***  -0.095***  -0.245* 
 (0.063)  (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.130) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.021  -0.016  -0.025  0.125 
 (0.122)  (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.196) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,133  25,122  5,328  575 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.793  0.834  0.859  0.833 
Panel C: Variable Pay 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.269***  -0.078  -0.307***  -0.319 
 (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.291) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.039  -0.088  0.146  0.045 
 (0.156)  (0.144)  (0.145)  (0.325) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,021  4,397  3,097  484 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.845  0.844  0.844  0.833 
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TABLE A.18 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level on  
executives’ compensation levels, top earners 
This table presents the results for top-earning executives, who are paid above the median, to account for 
potential discriminating relations between the highest incomes and bargaining power (matched sample). 
This table presents the cross-country regression results for executives’ compensation levels from 2012 to 2017, 
separately, for Austria (AT), the reform country, Germany (DE), the U.S., the U.K., and France (FR), all non-
reform countries. We restrict the sample of treated executives to executives in the upper quartile (> p(75)) in 
terms of the variable PayDifference. The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total 
compensation (Panel A), fixed compensation (Panel B), and variable compensation (Panel C). The variable 
Reform is an indicator variable taking the value of one for 2014 onward. The variable Treatment is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one for Austrian executives earning more than EUR 500,000 in 2012/13. The variable 
Treatment takes the value of one for German executives earning more than EUR 1.7 million, U.S. executives 
earning more than EUR 500,000, U.K. executives earning more than EUR 500,000, and French executives 
earning more than EUR 1.8 million in 2012/13 (pseudo-reform). All the remaining independent variables are 
defined in Table 1. We report robust standard errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Total Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay  Total Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.382***  -0.170***  -0.179***  -0.121 
 (0.089)  (0.015)  (0.039)  (0.115) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.176  -0.007  0.026  -0.117 
 (0.143)  (0.113)  (0.116)  (0.170) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 958  22,090  4,800  492 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.881  0.833  0.873  0.910 
Panel B: Fixed Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay  Fixed Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.124  -0.114***  -0.082***  -0.264* 
 (0.096)  (0.011)  (0.028)  (0.133) 
Reform × Treatment × AT -0.076  -0.083  -0.093  0.060 
 (0.180)  (0.151)  (0.158)  (0.203) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 958  22,090  4,793  492 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.784  0.822  0.842  0.823 
Panel C: Variable Pay (Matched Sample) 
 DE  U.S.  U.K.  FR 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay  Variable Pay 
Reform × Treatment -0.422***  -0.098  -0.321***  -0.049 
 (0.110)  (0.077)  (0.067)  (0.120) 
Reform × Treatment × AT 0.248  -0.001  0.227  -0.174 
 (0.186)  (0.167)  (0.162)  (0.196) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 858  3,855  2,645  413 
Executive fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.837  0.855  0.850  0.836 
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TABLE A.19 
Effect of a tax deductibility limit at the firm level  
on firms’ investment, payout, and financial slack 
 
This table presents additional cross-country regression results for firms’ R&D investment and average 
employee compensation from 2012 to 2017 separately for Germany (DE) and the U.S. The variable R&D is 
defined as R&D expenses scaled over total assets and Employees is defined as average staff costs per 
employee. The variable TreatFirm is an indicator variable taking the value of one if any Austrian board 
member earned more than EUR 500,000 in 2012 and 2013. The variable TreatFirm takes the value of one for 
German executives earning more than EUR 3.35 million and for U.S. executives earning more than 
EUR 500,000. All the remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1. We report robust standard 
errors clustered at the executive level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant differences at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Germany 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 R&D Employees  R&D Employees 
Reform × TreatFirm -0.011 -0.078  -0.009 -0.113 
 (0.009) (0.153)  (0.010) (0.173) 
Reform × TreatFirm × AT 0.054 -0.047  0.047 0.005 
 (0.034) (0.165)  (0.029) (0.200) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 201 261  201 261 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.523 0.185  0.525 0.126 
Panel B: U.S. 
 Full Sample  Matched Sample 
 
 (1) (2) 
 (3) (4) 
 R&D Employees  R&D Employees 
Reform × TreatFirm -0.013 0.038  -0.011 -0.035 
 (0.013) (0.116)  (0.011) (0.129) 
Reform × TreatFirm × AT 0.020 0.054  0.029 -0.042 
 (0.022) (0.232)  (0.023) (0.156) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4,136 1,750  4,129 1,746 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.257 0.323  0.340 0.201 
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